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Abstract 
 
Voice over IP (VoIP) is gaining more popularity in today‟s 
communications. The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is becoming 
one of the dominant VoIP signalling protocol[1, 2], however it is 
vulnerable to many kinds of attacks. Among these attacks, flood-based 
denial of service attacks have been identified as the major threat to SIP. 
Even though a great deal of research has been carried out to mitigate 
denial of service attacks, only a small proportion has been specific to 
SIP. This project examines the way denial of service attacks affect the 
performance of a SIP-based system and two  evolutionary solutions to 
this problem that build on each other are proposed with experimental 
results to demonstrate the effectiveness of each solution.  
In stage one, this project proposes the Security-Enhanced SIP 
System (SESS), which contains a security-enhanced firewall, which 
evolved from the work of stage one and a security-enhanced SIP proxy 
server. This approach helps to improve the Quality-of-Service (QoS) 
of legitimate users during the SIP flooding attack, while maintaining a 
100 percent success rate in blocking attack traffic. However, this 
system only mitigates SIP INVITE and REGISTER floods.  
In stage two, this project further advances SESS, and proposes an 
Improved Security-Enhanced SIP System (ISESS). ISESS advances 
the solution by blocking other SIP request floods, for example 
CANCEL, OK and BYE flood. 
JAIN Service Logic Execution Environment (JAIN SLEE) is a 
java-based application server specifically designed for event-driven 
applications. JAIN SLEE is used to implement enhancements of the 
SIP proxy server, as it is becoming a popular choice in implementing 
communication applications.  
The experimental results show that during a SIP flood, ISESS 
cannot only drop all attack packets but also the call setup delay of 
legitimate users can be improved substantially compared to and 
unsecured VoIP system.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Voice over IP (VoIP) is an increasingly popular form of voice 
communication. In VoIP call setup and management operations are 
completed through signalling messages and most modern VoIP 
systems use the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [3] for the  signalling 
process [4].  However, SIP is vulnerable to many kinds of attacks [5] 
[6] [7] [8] [9] [10] among which flood-based Denial of Service (DoS) 
attack [11] is identified as the biggest threat [9] [12] [13]. For example, 
asterisk (an open source SIP-based VoIP switch) is used by some 
organizations to establish VoIP calls between internal users and 
external users. Since the transmission link between the internal and 
external users is the internet, the VoIP switch is vulnerable to attacks 
sfrom the internet. Even though a great deal of research [14] [15] [16] 
[17] [18] [19]  has been carried out to mitigate DoS attacks, only a 
fraction of this work is specific to SIP, further more, the existing 
solutions have their limitations in terms of complexity, accuracy and 
so on. SIP flood protection is only handled in a very limited manner by 
the majority of firewalls, thus there is much work remaining to be 
done. 
 
1.1 Objective and Approach 
There are two major types of SIP-based VoIP deployment: VoIP 
on a purely private network, and VoIP on an open Internet. When 
VoIP is deployed on a purely private network, it is normally highly 
integrated with a PSTN network and VPN, where users cannot access 
the system from outside. This can protect the system from external 
attacks, however it cannot stop attacks from the internal network. If 
this system is deployed as a public service, and can be accessed via the 
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Internet, it is susceptible to flood attacks from both internal and 
external users. Even though the topological implementations are 
different on the different types of SIP-based VoIP deployment, the 
attack mechanism and impact are similar in both systems.  
 
The objective of this thesis is to find a solution to mitigate SIP 
flooding attacks, which is able to drop the majority of attack packets 
while continuing to provide a good QoS for legitimate users. The 
approach used in this project is to develop a protocol and verify its 
performance using a VoIP testbed. 
This project firstly examines the impact of a SIP flooding attack 
on a SIP-based VoIP system. In this system, a SIP proxy server is in 
charge of forwarding SIP requests and responses to the corresponding 
recipients, and is most vulnerable to flooding attacks, because it has to 
process each incoming SIP request, look up the address of the recipient 
and it may need to generate, store and send authentication requests. 
While there are a number of types of SIP requests that can be used to 
flood the SIP proxy server, in this project we focus on the INVITE 
flood as an example to illustrate the impact of this attack, because 
INVITE and REGISTER requests require more processing compared 
to other SIP requests, and the behaviour of INVITE and REGISTER 
requests are very similar. For simplicity, we will mainly use INVITE 
requests to illustrate the impact of SIP floods.  Our objective, however, 
is to deliver a protocol which addresses a wide range of SIP flooding 
attacks, such as the INVITE flood, the CANCEL flood and the OK 
flood. 
Having demonstrated and established the impact of the SIP 
INVITE flooding attack, we further examined a couple of commercial 
firewalls‟ performances against SIP flood attacks. Experimental results 
showed that the SIP flood attacks can defeat the security mechanisms 
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of the tested firewalls. The implication is that any businesses using 
these firewalls are vulnerable to SIP flood attacks. Furthermore, any 
other commercial firewalls with similar security mechanisms are also 
vulnerable to this type of attack. In order to mitigate SIP flood attacks, 
two evolutionary solutions are proposed, and each solution‟s 
advantages and drawbacks are discussed and verified with 
experimental results. 
In stage one, this project proposes a Security-Enhanced SIP 
System (SESS), which contains a security-enhanced firewall evolved 
from an application-layer stateless firewall with additional layer-3 
queuing and a security-enhanced SIP proxy server. This approach is an 
advance on the previous one in that it improves the QoS of legitimate 
users during a flooding attack.  
In stage two, this project further evolves SESS, and proposes an 
Improved Security-Enhanced SIP System (ISESS). ISESS advances 
the solution by blocking other SIP request floods, for example 
CANCEL, OK and BYE floods. 
JAIN SLEE is used to implement enhancement of the SIP proxy 
server. This is because JAIN SLEE provides high performance and 
low latency for communication applications. Additionally it uses Java, 
a high level language, which reduces the implementation time.  
. Experimental results verify that the final solution is able to 
block all types of spoofed SIP requests, while maintaining a good QoS 
for legitimate users.  
1.2 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is structured as follows:  
Chapter two provides an overview of VoIP, and the general 
information of SIP, followed by the common threats to a SIP-based 
VoIP system. It is important to note that this project focuses on flood-
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based SIP DoS attacks, thus a few existing SIP flooding attack 
mitigation techniques will be described and analyzed. Their 
advantages and drawbacks will be discussed.  
Chapter three discusses SIP flooding attacks in detail, followed 
by descriptions of existing mitigation techniques. The performance of 
a couple of commercial firewalls is examined using a VoIP testbed, 
and the vulnerabilities of these firewalls are identified.  
Chapter four details a proposed solution- the Security-Enhanced 
SIP system (SESS) which mitigates spoofed SIP INVITE and 
REGISTER flood while maintaining a good Quality-of-Service for 
legitimate users. The advantages and drawbacks of SESS are discussed. 
Prior to SESS, an application-layer stateless firewall is proposed to 
stop spoofed INVITE and REGISTER floods, which SESS is based on. 
The details of the application-layer stateless firewall are discussed and 
its performance is examined using our VoIP testbed. 
Chapter five provides an explanation for an improved solution 
based on SESS – Improved Security-Enhanced SIP system (ISESS). 
ISESS is an advance on SESS in that it eliminates its drawbacks, while 
still maintaining the advantages of SESS.  
Chapter six describes the implementation process of SESS and 
ISESS, followed by a series of experiments. Experimental results are 
carefully analysed. Experimental results show that by using ISESS the 
objectives of this project can be achieved.  
Chapter seven is the conclusion section and suggestions for 
future work are also discussed.  
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Chapter 2  
Background 
2.1 VoIP overview 
The term Voice over IP (VoIP) is used to describe the technology 
for enabling voice communication over IP networks to a similar level 
of functionality and quality as is available on a traditional public 
switched telephony network (PSTN). VoIP technology employs a suite 
of protocols which can be categorized into signalling and data transfer 
protocols. There is a strong business and consumer interest in VoIP 
owing to its potential for providing a more flexible service at a much 
lower cost than is typically available from analogue telephony. 
However, as it is built on standard IP networks, it is vulnerable to the 
wide range of network attacks associated with the Internet, such as 
DoS, eavesdropping, virus infection, trojans etc [10].  
This thesis focuses specifically on SIP-based flooding which is 
one of the more common ways to attack SIP systems.  
2.1.1 Quality of Service (QoS) and security 
requirements of VoIP 
VoIP faces two challenges which are more serious than in 
traditional PSTN networks: quality of service and security. Owing to 
the fact that in VoIP networks there is typically a great deal of 
infrastructure resource sharing, the quality of a VoIP network cannot 
be guaranteed to the same extent as in the PSTN network. Service 
quality on a VoIP network consists of the following factors [20]: 
Network Availability, Latency, Jitter and Packet Loss.  In this project, 
call setup delays will be measured as the main system performance 
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factor. Call setup delay indicates the time takes to setup a phone call. 
This can reflect the latency of the network during the call setup phase, 
and the call setup timeout rates can indicate the network availability. 
Jitter and packet loss rate are not measured due to the limitation of the 
experimental measuring tool.  
2.1.2 VoIP protocol stack 
VoIP protocols can be divided into two categories: Signalling 
and voice transmission protocols. Figure 1 [21] shows the essential 
protocols in a typical VoIP protocol stack. 
 
 
Figure 1: Essential protocols in a VoIP protocol stack 
The signalling protocols are in charge of setting up, managing, 
controlling and terminating a session. The voice transmission 
protocols are responsible for transmitting the actual voice data across 
the network. In the following section, we will discuss the main VoIP 
signalling protocols (H.323 [22] and Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) 
[23]) in detail. The vulnerabilities of VoIP will also be described.  
2.1.2.1 Signalling protocols 
Both H.323 and SIP provide functionalities for call setup, 
management, and termination. These protocols enable amongst other 
 13 
things negotiation of the codec to be used in voice data encoding and 
the delivery mechanisms (e.g. RTP [24] over UDP/IP [25]) for both 
protocols. The following subsections detail the call setup and 
management in the two protocols, 
2.1.2.1.1 H.323 
H.323 is a protocol suite that was designed to enable IP-based 
multimedia communications, and it was the first widely adopted and 
deployed VoIP protocol. Figure 2 [22] shows a H.323 protocol suite.  
 
 
Figure 2: H.323 protocol suite 
 
The core protocols contained in H.323 suite are:  
 H.245 [26] for opening and closing logic channels for each 
multimedia session; H.245 is also in charge of capacity and codec 
negotiation. Two H.323 end points can set up a fast connection 
without a gatekeeper, by exchanging H.245 messages. 
 H.225 [27] for call setup, alert, connecting, and call termination;  
 RAS [22] (Registration, Admission, Status) is used to phone 
management. RAS establishes logical channels between phones 
and gatekeepers that manage these phones. Without appropriate 
RAS communication, a phone cannot place or receive phone calls. 
 RTP is used for sending or receiving multimedia information.  
H.245 
H.225 Voice 
Call Control RAS RTP RTCP 
TCP UDP 
For each packet: 
  Extract the final TTL Tf and the source IP 
address S; 
  Compute the hop-count Hc = Ti –Tf; 
  Index S so get the stored hop-count Hs; 
  If (Hc not equal to Hs) 
The packet is spoofed; 
  Else  
    The packet is legitimate 
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Drawbacks of H.323 
While H.323 is the most widely used VoIP protocol suite, it has a 
number of drawbacks. The major one is the lack of scalability: H.323 
was originally designed to be used on a LAN. The newest version of 
H.323 defines methods for locating users across a zone. However, 
when there are multiple domains, H.323 has a scalability problem as 
there is no easy way to perform loop detection. Another drawback to 
using H.323 is complexity which stems from the use of several 
protocol components. This also complicates firewall traversal, as 
firewalls must act as application level proxies [28], parsing the entire 
message to arrive at the required fields. Furthermore, H.323 has poor 
extensibility, which means it is hard to develop additional extensions 
for this protocol.  
Since this project will only focus on SIP-based VoIP systems, the 
details of H.323 will not be discussed in detail in this document. 
2.1.2.1.2 Session Initiation Protocol 
SIP is a lightweight application layer protocol designed to manage and 
establish multimedia sessions such as video conferencing, voice calls, 
and data sharing through requests and responses. It is increasingly 
gaining favour over H.323 in the VoIP environment. Three advantages 
of SIP are: 
 It uses Uniform Resource Locators (URL) [29] addressing scheme, 
which is physical location independent. Addressing can be a phone 
number, an IP address, or an e-mail address. The messages are 
very similar to those used by the Internet (HTTP [30]). 
 It allows multiple media sessions during one call. This means that 
users can share a game, instant message (IM), and talk at the same 
time.  
 It is a “light” protocol and is easily scaleable. 
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Packetizer [31] and Schulzrinne et al. [4] have compared the 
performance of these two protocols thoroughly. Schulzrinne concludes 
that even though H.323 and SIP provide similar functionality, SIP is a 
better candidate for VoIP in terms of simplicity, extensibility and 
scalability.  
Since SIP is just an application layer signalling protocol, many 
security mechanisms are optional and little attention has been given to 
SIP security features [9].   
The following section describes the SIP-based VoIP systems in detail. 
2.2 SIP-based VoIP systems 
This section will firstly provide an overview of SIP messages 
and SIP components, and then explain the SIP processes in detail. A 
detailed review of the threats to and security of the SIP protocol is 
studied.   
2.2.1 SIP components 
A SIP-based VoIP system contains the following four essential 
components: 
 User Agent (UA) is the component interacting with the end user to 
complete a SIP request. A SIP client can act as both a SIP user 
agent client (UAC) and a SIP user agent server (UAS), where the 
UAC generates outgoing SIP requests, and UAS handles incoming 
SIP requests. 
  SIP proxy server: the SIP proxy server receives SIP requests from 
various user agents and forwards them to the appropriate hosts. It 
may also contain an authentication function;  
 Registrar server: It processes REGISTER messages (described in 
the next section), and it maps the users URI to their current 
location. For example, 2001@testbed.com may be mapped to 
2001@192.168.2.4:5060, where 192.168.2.4 is the current IP 
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address of the client 2001, and 5060 is the port on which his SIP 
UA is listening. In some systems, the registrar server is located on 
the SIP proxy server.  
 Location Server: A location server is used to store the locations of 
registered users. It is used by a proxy to find the destination 
client‟s possible location. This function is most often performed by 
the registrar server.  
There are also some other components in a SIP-based VoIP 
system, for example Redirect server; however we will not discuss 
them in this project as they are not essential to the VoIP system.  
2.2.2 SIP Messages 
SIP uses header messages similar to HTTP [30] to communicate. 
The message body is either used to describe session requirements or to 
encapsulate various types of signalling. SIP addresses follow the 
general form of email addresses; an example of a SIP address is 
sip:2001@testbed.com. The text-based presentation of a SIP message 
makes it more vulnerable to attacks. Figure 3 shows a typical SIP 
INVITE message, and Figure 4 shows a typical REGISTER message. 
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Figure 3: typical SIP INVITE message 
 
Figure 4: typical SIP REGISTER message 
 
There are two types of SIP messages: request, and response to a 
corresponding request message. Request messages are used by UAC, 
and responses are used by UAS. When a userA wants to make a phone 
call to userB, userA‟s UAC will generate an INVITE message, and 
send it to userB‟s UAS (it may or may not be via a SIP proxy server), 
Request-Line: INVITE sip:2002@opencloud.com 
 Method: INVITE 
 [Recent Packet: False] 
Message Header 
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 10.0.0.34:5060; rport; 
branch=z9hG4bK56612D86EA77e51A 
Max-Forwards: 70 
From: 2003<sip:2003@testbed.com>;tag=301012803 
To:2002<sip:2002@testbed.com> 
Contact: <sip:2003@10.0.0.34:5060> 
Call-ID:-327e-jki398slmen@10.0.0.34 
CSeq:2 INVITE 
Content-Type: application/sdp 
User-Agent: Elite 1.0 Brcm callctrl/1.5.1.0  
Content-Length:458 
Supported: timer 
Allow: NOTIFY 
Allow: REFER 
Allow: OPTIONS 
Allow: INVITE 
Allow: ACK 
Allow: CANCEL 
Allow: BYE 
 
Request-Line: REGISTER sip:2003@opencloud.com 
 Method: REGISTER 
 [Recent Packet: False] 
Message Header 
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 10.0.0.34:5060; rport; 
branch=z9hG4bK56612D86EA77e51A 
Max-Forwards: 70 
From: 2003<sip:2003@testbed.com>;tag=301012803 
To:2003<sip:2003@10.0.0.34:5060> 
Contact: <sip:2003@10.0.0.34:5060> 
Call-ID:so98-8834-327e-jki398slmen@10.0.0.34 
CSeq:1 REGISTER 
Expires: 3600 
Content-Length: 0 
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Then, userB‟s UAS will process that request, and send corresponding 
responses. Table 1 shows the common SIP request messages.  
 
Table1: Common SIP Requests 
 
SIP Request Purpose 
INVITE To initiate a session 
BYE To terminate an existing session 
OPTIONS To determine the SIP messages and codecs that the 
UA or server understands 
REGISTER To register a location from a SIP user 
ACK To acknowledge a response from an INVITE 
request 
CANCEL To cancel a pending INVITE request (it is 
important to note that this operation does not affect 
a completed request? ) 
SUBSCRIBE To indicate the desire for future NOTIFY requests 
NOTIFY To provide information about a state change that is 
not related to a specific session. (For example, 
Windows instant messenger uses NOTIFY to 
transfer group information.) 
REFER To transfer calls and contact external resources 
  
SIP responses are three-digit codes similar to HTTP (for example, 
404 Not Found, and 200 OK). The first digit indicates the category of 
the responses. There are 6 categories, namely: information responses 
(1xx), successful responses (2xx), redirect responses (3xx), request 
failure (4xx), server failure (5xx) and global failure (6xx). There are 
dozens of response messages, and table 2 shows only a few very 
common SIP responses. 
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Table 2: Brief overview of SIP responses 
 
Response Purpose 
100 Trying To indicate a proxy has received an INVITE 
request, and is processing it. 
180 Ringing The INVITE has been forwarded to the destination 
200 OK A session has been set up 
401 
Unauthorized 
A response to a REGISTER request, if the user did 
not provide correct authentication information 
407 Proxy 
Authentication 
Required 
A response to an INVITE request, if authentication 
is enabled on the proxy, and the user did not 
provide correct authentication information 
408 Request 
timeout 
To indicate there is no response to a request within 
a certain time 
503 Service 
unavailable 
To indicate the current request cannot be processed 
 
2.2.3 SIP process 
To explain how SIP components interact with each other using 
SIP messages, this section will discuss the processes involved in a SIP-
based VoIP system.  Figure 5 shows the flow of interaction of a SIP-
based VoIP system.  
The main SIP operations involved in a VoIP system are: 
 Registration: If a user agent wants to receive phone calls, he has to 
register with the registrar by sending a REGISTER request (Step 5 
in figure 6).    
 Invite: When a user wants to place a phone call, it will send an 
INVITE request to his proxy server (Step 2 in figure 5).  
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 The proxy server will process the request (the process will be 
explained in a later subsection), and forward it to the callee.  
 When the callee picks up the phone, an OK response will be sent 
back to the caller. Then the session is set up.  
It is important to note that, for simplicity, some minor message 
exchanges are not shown.   
 
 
 
Figure 5: SIP operations 
2.2.3.1 SIP proxy operations on INVITE request 
A SIP proxy can operate in two models: authentication enabled, 
and no authentication. In order to receive phone calls from previously 
unknown callers (possibly globally), a SIP proxy has to disable 
authentication on INVITE requests. There is a unique field in the SIP 
header called CallID, which is a UAC generated random ID to identify 
a session. All subsequent requests and responses within that session 
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will carry the same CallID. When no authentication is required, the 
proxy does the following with an INVITE request: 
 When an INVITE is received at proxy, the proxy will send a query 
to the location server, to find the actual contact address of the 
destination, 
 When the INVITE is forwarded to the destination, 100 TRYING 
and 180 RINGING responses are sent back to the caller.  
 As soon as the callee picks up the phone, an OK response is sent 
back to the caller.  
 Finally, an acknowledgment (ACK) request is sent to the callee, 
then the voice session starts.  
This process is slightly different if authentication is enabled on the 
proxy server. The behaviour of the authentication enabled proxy server 
will be discussed in the following subsection.  
2.2.4 SIP authentication 
As specified in RFC3261, SIP provides a challenge-response-
based authentication using HTTP digest authentication. Using this 
mechanism the SIP user agent client (UAC) is able to identify itself to 
a user agent server (UAS) (or proxy server or registrar server). 
Therefore, SIP authentication applies only to user-to-user or user-to-
proxy communications; 
After the SIP proxy server receives the INVITE, instead of 
processing the INVITE request, the proxy server will send a 407 
Authentication required response to challenge the caller. In the 407 
message, there is a “nonce” value, which is a random string generated 
by the proxy server used for one challenge only. Both the SIP server 
(proxy, registrar) and UAC share a secret password, which is 
sometimes the password for the user. The caller uses the nonce, 
username, password and realm to create a unique response value. The 
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UAC sends the request again, including the computed response value, 
which is used by the server to authenticate the request. Using this 
mechanism, the password is never sent in clear text. An illustration of 
the digest authentication procedure is given in figure 6. MD5 is the 
default function used for computing the response by combining the 
input parameters [32]. This mechanism puts more processing load on 
the SIP proxy server, thus making it more vulnerable to flooding 
attacks.  
In the following section, SIP-based VoIP system vulnerabilities 
will be discussed. Since this project focuses on SIP flood DoS attacks, 
chapter three will explain this type of attack in detail. 
 
 
Figure 6: SIP proxy authentication process 
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2.3 SIP vulnerabilities 
Like any other IP-based system, VoIP systems are susceptible to a 
variety of attacks [33, 34]. The most common VoIP attacks are: 
Eavesdropping [35], Flooding based denial of service attack [36] (The 
most common DoS attacks are: UDP flooding [37] and TCP SYN 
flooding [38] [39] ), Packet fragmentation attack [40] [41](for example 
the ping of death [42]), RTP insertion attack [43], Fuzzing/Malformed 
message DoS attack [44] (which can be used to find a flaw in the 
target system and cause DoS on a VoIP entity), Spam over internet 
telephony (SIPT)  [45, 46] ( Even though this kind of attack is still 
very rare, a number of  researchers have published work in this area 
[46-49]), and Voice Phishing (Vishing) [50] (Vishing is typically used 
in identity theft schemes such as cleverly impersonating highly trusted 
entities (banks), to obtain the personal and financial information of 
other users).  
Since this project focuses on the SIP-based VoIP system, this thesis 
will discuss attacks specific to SIP in detail. 
There are many lists of security threats that are specific to SIP-based 
VoIP systems [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [51] [52].  Salsano et al [9] 
identify that a SIP-based VoIP system is especially prone to DoS 
attacks. Based on a VoIP threat taxonomy compiled by VOIPSA [53], 
a DoS attack can be categorised into the following groups:  
 Network bandwidth attack. A network bandwidth DoS attack 
simply floods a target with a large number of random packets in an 
attempt to congest its network bandwidth.  
 OS/firmware attack. An OS/firmware DoS attack attempts to crash 
a target by exploiting some specific underlying OS/firmware 
vulnerabilities. It can also exhaust the target by over consuming 
OS/firmware resources, such as CPU and memory.  
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 SIP-function specific attack. This is an attack specific to some 
functions of SIP, such as call setup time. 
Since work has already been carried out on the first two 
categories of attacks [54] [55] [15] [54] [56] [57] [16], this project will 
focus on the attacks that are specific to SIP.  
In this section, we will list a few of the most common SIP 
application-layer security threats, and will explain the SIP flooding 
attacks in detail.  
2.3.1 Signalling manipulation 
There are several attacks in which an attacker manipulates a SIP 
signalling message to hijack or manipulate calls.  
2.3.1.1 Registration removal 
Registration removal can be done by modifying the REGISTER 
request [58]. There are two important fields in a REGISTER header, 
one is Contact, and the other is Expires. The contact header specifies 
the actual address that the registrant is listening on for incoming calls. 
Expires specifies when this registration expires.  To remove a 
registration, the attacker needs to send a REGISTER message with 
Contact set to *, and Expires set to 0. Figure 7 shows a spoofed 
registration removal message.  
2.3.1.2 Registration addition 
The SIP registrar allows multiple contact addresses for one user, 
all of which can ring when an inbound call arrives. When multiple SIP 
phones ring, the first one to go off hook will answer the call. This 
behaviour creates the opportunity for several attacks. For example, an 
attacker can add multiple addresses to every registration and when 
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some one makes a phone call to one of them, multiple phones would 
ring, and this would cause chaos in an enterprise.  
 
 
Figure 7: Registration removal message 
2.3.1.3 Registration hijacking 
Registration hijacking occurs when an attacker impersonates a 
valid UA to a registrar and replaces the legitimate registration with its 
own address.  In SIP, a User Agent (UA) must register itself with a SIP 
proxy/registrar (or IP PBX), which allows the proxy to direct inbound 
calls to the UA. When a UA registers itself it sends a REGISTER 
request which contains the Contact: header which indicates the IP 
address of the user's device. The registrar would take the Contact as 
the binding address of the requesting UA. An attacker can replace the 
legitimate Contact with its own IP address. The effect of this attack is 
that all the inbound calls will be directed to the attacker‟s UA. 
Furthermore, registration is normally performed using UDP, which is 
more susceptible to spoofed attack. According to RFC 3261, not all 
registrars require authentication for the requesting UA, even if it does, 
the authentication mechanism is very weak (username and password). 
Thus this type of attack can be a big threat to a SIP-based VoIP system. 
Request-Line: REGISTER sip:2003@opencloud.com 
 Method: REGISTER 
 [Recent Packet: False] 
Message Header 
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 10.0.0.34:5060; rport; 
branch=z9hG4bK56612D86EA77e51A 
Max-Forwards: 70 
From: 2003<sip:2003@testbed.com>;tag=301012803 
To:2003<sip:2003@10.0.0.34:5060> 
Contact: * 
Call-ID:82s98909-327e-jki398slmen@10.0.0.34 
CSeq:1 REGISTER 
Expires: 0 
Content-Length: 0 
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2.3.1.4 Signalling manipulation countermeasure 
One way to mitigate the above signalling manipulation attack is 
to enable authentication on the registrar. Since REGISTER messages 
are not exchanged frequently, so the overhead for authentication is 
minimal. Authentication requires that only legitimate users can register 
(for example, people from the enterprise) and that strong passwords 
are used. This project will focus on signalling manipulation attacks, 
since this attack can be eliminated by enabling authentication. 
2.3.2 Malformed message and countermeasure 
Other DoS attack opportunities are caused by implementation 
flaws of SIP systems. A large number of systems are found to be 
vulnerable to malformed SIP messages [59]. Such DoS attack does not 
have a generalised impact on VoIP systems, because it can only target 
specific implementations or products. These vulnerabilities are 
typically short lived and easily fixed through software patches. 
2.3.3 Flood-based DoS attack 
A flooding-based DoS [60] attack can be achieved by using 
massive volumes of useless traffic to occupy all the resources that 
would otherwise be used to service legitimate traffic. If the attack 
traffic comes from multiple sources, it is called a Distributed DoS 
(DDoS). This type of DoS attack is hard to prevent, as the targets can 
be attacked simply because they are connected to the public Internet. 
As mentioned earlier [12], flood-based DoS attack is the biggest threat 
VoIP is facing and the remainder of this project focuses on these 
attacks and their mitigation. In Chapter three, the details of this type of 
attack will be discussed, followed by existing mitigation techniques. 
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Chapter 3: SIP flood attacks and existing 
countermeasures 
As mentioned in section 1.1, SIP flood attacks are the major 
threat to VoIP systems. This chapter will explain how such attacks can 
affect the performance of the system, using an INVITE flood as an 
example, with an experimental verification. Later, a few existing SIP 
flood mitigation techniques will be examined and their advantages and 
drawbacks will be discussed. 
 
3.1 Overview of SIP message flooding attack 
A SIP message flooding attack occurs when an attacker sends a 
large number of INVITE or REGISTER requests with spoofed source 
IP addresses [61]. It is worth pointing out that even though there are 
many other types of SIP requests, INVITE and REGISTER are the 
predominant messages used by SIP[3], and they require more 
processing at the SIP components than all the other requests. Thus, 
SIP-based VoIP systems are especially vulnerable to flooding attacks 
using these requests. Figure 8 shows the message flow to setup a VoIP 
session. 
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Figure 8: SIP call setup process 
There are two major impacts resulting from a SIP flooding attack: 
 Memory exhaustion: When a SIP proxy server receives a SIP 
request (REGISTER or INVITE) it needs to copy each incoming 
request into its internal buffers to be able to process the message. 
These messages will at least be kept till the last OK message is 
sent to terminate the call setup handshake. Also, the server 
normally keeps a copy of forwarded messages for further 
processing (for example, digest authentication). In some cases the 
server is configured as a stateful server, which will need to 
maintain information about the session throughout the lifetime of 
the session, for example when the communication path involves 
firewall or NAT traversal [62]. The size of SIP messages can vary 
from hundreds to thousands of bytes, and the call setup handshake 
normally lasts from 1 second to a few seconds if human interaction 
is required, which makes the proxy server vulnerable to memory 
exhaustion attacks.  
 CPU exhaustion: After the incoming requests are saved, the SIP 
proxy server will process (authentication or destination address 
look-up etc.) the requests and generate and send responses. The 
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CPU resource can become highly loaded if a large number of 
requests are flooded at the SIP proxy server.  
 Link Bandwidth. SIP flooding attacks can exhaust the link 
bandwidth of the SIP proxy server and cause a denial of service at 
the access point to the VoIP system.  
While enabling authentication on the SIP proxy server will avoid 
some types of flooding attack, it requires more resources to process 
each incoming request (e.g. more RAM is needed to store generated 
nonce values and more CPU to calculate them). Hence any attack 
which can be mounted on an authenticating server will have a more 
devastating effect than would be the case on a non-authenticating 
server. 
3.1.1 SIP Flooding Test Bed 
In order to examine the effect of INVITE flooding attacks on the 
performance of a SIP proxy server, a VoIP test bed was established 
and an attack tool based on an INVITE Flooder [63], called iFlood [64] 
was developed.  
The basic test bed is as shown in Figure 9: 
 
 
Figure 9: SIP Test bed Setup without Firewall 
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The initial SIP proxy server that was used was the Asterisk 
1
 
public domain server.  The SIP client software was an X-lite SIP soft 
phone.   
iFlood is used to generate a large number of INVITE messages, 
with spoofed source IP addresses. The attack can specify the range of 
IP addresses to be spoofed, as well as the spoofed username.  The 
iflood command to send INVITE flood is:  
./iflood eth0 target_extension target_domain target_ip num_of_attack_packets 
spoofed_IP_range –S source_extension 
 
eth0 is the network interface that the attack uses to send attack packets; 
target_extension is the extension of the target host, it can either be a 
number, or a word, for example: 2002 or testbed02; 
target_domain is the domain of the target host, in our testbed, the 
domain is testbed.com; 
target_ip is the IP address of the target domain. However, it is worth  
noting that if a NAT-enabled firewall is used, the target_ip should be 
the IP address of the external interface of the firewall;  
num_of_attack_packets is the total number of attack packets to be 
sent; 
spoofed_IP_range is the range of IP addresses to be spoofed. There 
are two options: random or ranged. Random option means using 
randomly spoofed IP addresses. Ranged option allows the attacker to 
specify the range of IP addresses to be used. This option can be useful, 
if the firewall has ingress filter enabled; and  
source_extension is the extension used by the spoofed SIP request.  
                                                 
1
 Asterisk® is the world‟s leading open source telephony engine and tool kit, and has 
the largest support community. For more information, please visit 
http://www.asterisk.org/ 
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3.1.2 SIP Flood Test  
The SIP proxy server was flooded with 60,000 INVITE packets 
at the attack machine‟s maximum rate of 3245 packets/second, and the 
call setup delays monitored during the attack. Figure 10 shows the call 
setup delay when the system is under SIP flooding attack. 
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Figure 10: call setup delay during INVITE flood 
From this experiment we can see that as the number of attack 
packets increases the call setup delay increases. When the amount of 
attack packets reaches a critical point, call setup will be timed out (the 
timeout configured for this testbed is 60 seconds).  
This experiment demonstrates that a SIP-based VoIP system is 
vulnerable to SIP request flooding attacks.  
3.2 Existing SIP flooding attack mitigations 
 
3.2.1 Firewall 
Implementation of a firewall is the most common security 
technique used to protect network components from external attacks. 
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Traditional firewalls use layer-3 filters to block unwanted traffic while 
some modern firewalls use application-layer gateways based on layer-
7 filtering. Firewalls are generally designed for general purpose traffic 
filtering, and will often not detect application-specific attack traffic.  
A series of tests were carried out to verify the effectiveness of 
firewall mitigation.  The experiment testbed setup with a firewall is 
shown in figure 11. Five windows XP professional computer with 
256MB ram are used to build this testbed, where three computers have 
X-lite 3.0 
2
installed are used as SIP users (two internal and one 
external), one computer is used as the attacker and one is used as the 
firewall and the packet analyser. Packet analysing tool we used is 
wireshark.  
 
Figure 11: Firewalled Test Bed 
3.2.1.1 Experiment set 1: WatchGuard Firewall 
In the first set of experiments, a standard WatchGuard firebox 5 
was used. WatchGuard firebox‟s external interface only accepts 
requests belonging to the same subnet. In our experiment, we assume 
that the attack knows the IP address range of the subnet. This is 
because it is not difficult to find out the address of the external 
                                                 
2
 X-Lite is a SIP soft phone developed by CounterPath Corp. 
http://www.counterpath.com/x-lite.html&active=4 
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interface of the firewall. For example, trace route can be used to find 
the address of that interface; additionally, if an attacker monitors the 
traffic of a legitimate user, it is not hard to guess the range of IP 
addresses used in this subnet.  
There is an option on WatchGuard firebox to defeat DoS attacks, 
called “block spoofing attack”, which was supposed to be able to 
recognize packets with spoofed IP addresses and block them. In our 
experiment, we have enabled this function, and flooded the SIP proxy 
server with 60,000 INVITE requests. Figure 12 shows the attack 
command. 
 
 
Figure 12: iFlood attack tool command 
The call setup delay and the number of attack packets passing 
through the firewall were measured during the attack. Figure 13 shows 
the call setup delays during this attack, followed by a graph showing 
the number of attack packets passed through the firewall (Figure 14).  
[root@testbed34]# ./iflood eth0 2002 opencloud.com 10.0.0.1 
60000 ranged –S 2004 
Enter starting IPv4 address: 10.0.0.2 
Enter ending IPv4 address: 10.255.255.254 
Sent: 24782 
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Figure 13: Call setup delay during INVITE flood 
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Figure 14: Number of attack packets passed through the firewall. 
From this diagram, we can see that most of the spoofed INVITE 
flood can still pass through WatchGuard firebox even with the anti-
spoof attack function enabled. Figure 13 shows that as the number of 
attack packets increases, the call setup delay increases. When the 
number of attack packets exceeds 8000, the VoIP service is almost 
unusable. The client starts to get “500-server internal error” responses. 
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When the number of attack packets exceeds 10,000, the percentage of 
“server internal error” responses was 83%.  
This experiment shows that even with modern firewalls, SIP 
flood cannot be countered. In the next section, we use an intelligent 
SIP-capable firewall to mitigate SIP flood attacks.  
3.2.1.2 Experiment set 2: AR450 Firewall 
The second set of experiments was exactly the same as the first, 
but with the WatchGuard firewall replaced by the Allied Telesis SIP-
aware AR450 firewalls.   
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Figure 15: Call setup delay in SIP system when in flood burst 
mode 
Figure 15 shows the client call setup delay with respect to the number 
of attack requests sent. The long delay in call setup should be partially 
caused by network link congestion. 
Figure 16 shows the number of attack packets received with respect to 
the number of packets sent.  
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Figure 16: number of attack packets received on the SIP proxy 
server 
As with the first set of tests, the call setup delay increases as the 
number of attack packets increases. This is because as more attack 
packets reach the SIP proxy server, less processing power is left for 
legitimate users, thus delay occurs.   
However, in this experiment when the amount of attack traffic 
reaches a threshold, the firewall will detect the DDoS attack and block 
the flood traffic, and yet, still allow legitimate traffic to go through. 
After a series of test floods, the threshold value was found to be 
approximately 11,000 packets. However this value varies depending 
on the profile of previous attack traffic.  
This DDoS attack traffic block behaviour is very similar to a 
router attack traffic traceback mechanism [65] [66]. In a router IP 
traceback mechanism, when a DDoS attack is detected, traceback is 
triggered. It would take a while for the router to determine the source 
of the attack.  
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3.2.1.3 Experiment set 3: improved iFlood 
From the second experiment, we hypothesise that if the attack 
source generates short bursts of attack traffic, the firewall might not 
activate its defence mechanism.  In order to test this hypothesis, an 
improved iFlood was developed.  The improved iFlood adds an 
additional function which allows an attacker to optionally send the 
attack traffic in user sized chunks, with a specified delay between each 
chunk.  
For the third experiment we used the AR450 firewall testbed and 
the improved iflood using a rate of 1000 packets per chunk, and an 
inter-chunk interval delay of one second.  
Figure 17 shows the improved iFlood command. 
 
Figure 17: usage of improved iFlood. 
 
This specific chunk size and inter-chunk delay were arrived at 
based on intensive trial runs with varying sizes and delays.  During 
these trials, we found that if the attack rate is too low, there would be 
little impact on the performance of the system. If the attack rate is too 
high, most of the attack traffic will be lost owing to the network 
congestion. With 1000 packets per chunk delay of one second, we are 
able to block all incoming calls, and with a packet loss rate. Figure 18 
shows the call setup delay in this attack.  
 
[root@testbed34]# ./iflood eth0 2002 opencloud.com 10.0.0.1 
60000 ranged  chunk –S 2004 
Enter chunk size: 1000 
Enter time delay: 1 
Enter starting IPv4 address: 10.0.0.2 
Enter ending IPv4 address: 10.255.255.254 
Sent: 6000 
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Figure 18: Call setup delay in chunk attack with a rate of 1000 
packets per second 
  
As the number of attack packets increases, the call setup delay 
increases.  Monitoring showed that in this experiment 90.8% of the 
attack traffic passed through the firewall.  
Figure 18 proves the hypothesis that by having short bursts of 
attack traffic, the attacker is able to penetrate the protection of the 
firewall with sufficient attack packets to cause a SIP denial of service. 
This implies that any firewall that implements similar security 
mechanisms can also be defeated by advanced SIP flood attacks.  
3.2.2 Router-based flood mitigation 
Being the intermediate nodes of the network, routers may be 
used to reduce the impact of flood-based DoS attacks. The router 
mitigation mechanisms can be categorized into three types: attack 
early detection, attack traffic filtering and attacker traceback.  
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3.2.2.1 Attack early detection 
One type of router-based flood mitigation involves packet 
filtering, or bandwidth limitation on the intermediate routers [67] [57]. 
This mechanism usually requires specific agents to be installed on 
intermediate routers. Kashiwa, et al. [57] propose an Active Shaping 
mechanism to mitigate DDoS attacks which involves using extra 
monitoring and management components at the routers. At the root 
router near the protected network, a Probe Active Component (PAC) is 
used to monitor the traffic targeting at the protected network. If a 
DDoS attack is detected, the PAC sends messages to the Traffic-
control Active Component (TAC) to shape the incoming traffic. TACs 
are implemented on all the routers.  
Another example of traffic filtering is the Source Address 
Validity Enforcement protocol (SAVE) [68]. This protocol propagates 
source address information from the source location to the destination. 
SAVE runs on individual routers and builds incoming tables for them, 
allowing each router to verify whether each packet arrives at the 
expected interface. The router needs to save a large list containing the 
source address and destination prefix.  
Router-based flood mitigation has the potential to stop attacks at 
an early stage and thus minimize the effect of the attacks. However, 
these approaches require ubiquitous adoption of the proposed 
standards and coordination among different routers and networks, 
making implementation difficult, and this approach impractical.  
3.2.2.2 Attack traffic filtering 
This operation requires a router to inspect the packets as they 
pass through. If a packet is not legitimate, the router should drop it. 
The two most common examples of this operation are ingress filtering 
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[54] and egress filtering [69]. Ingress and egress filters determine 
whether a packet is legitimate based on the source IP address of the 
packet. Ingress filters filter a certain range of IP addresses at the 
router‟s external interface. Egress filter only allows packets with IP 
addresses from its own subnet to be processed.  
While attack traffic filtering can reduce the potential for flooding 
attack, it typically only eliminates attacks from certain network 
addresses, and spoofed flooding attack traffic is still able to pass 
through the routers. Again, to be effective, this requires that all routers 
adopt the protocol. 
Peng et al. [70] propose a DDoS mitigation mechanism using 
history-based IP filtering for edge routers. In this approach, the edge 
router creates an IP address database which stores the source IP 
addresses of legitimate users, so when the system is subsequently 
under a DoS attack, the legitimate user traffic can be protected. The 
approach is as follows:  
 distinguish legitimate traffic from attack traffic by using an IP 
address database;  
 build an efficient lookup mechanism; 
 apply filtering based on successful lookup.  
The history-based approach can be useful to VoIP, as people tend 
to make phone calls to the same destination and this is more effective 
in VoIP than any other IP-based applications. Peng et al [70] argue 
that in a flash crowd event (a sharp and often overwhelming increase 
in the number of users), 82.9% of the IP addresses have appeared 
before. However, in a flood-based DoS event it has been reported that 
only 0.6-14% of the IP addresses have appeared before.  
However, this approach does not address the fact that owing to 
the use of DHCP, the source IP addresses change over time, which 
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might cause an excessive amount of useless IP addresses being stored 
at the router, and slows the lookup process down.  
3.2.2.3 Attacker traceback 
Attacker traceback is an advanced security mechanism. There 
have been a number of proposals for traceback mechanisms to mitigate 
DoS attacks [71-74]. The simplest form of attacker traceback is IP 
traceback, which is concerned with detecting the source(s) of a DoS 
attack. However, since attackers often use spoofed IP addresses, it is 
impossible to use effective detection via a simple analysis of the IP 
header of the received packets. To avoid this problem, packet marking 
techniques can be employed [75]. The easiest form of marking is node 
append, where every router on the path crossed by a packet adds its IP 
address to the packet to facilitate the traceback process.  
Attacker traceback is able to choke the attack traffic at the origin, 
so this approach is able to eliminate the impact of DoS attacks totally. 
The draw back of this approach is that it is difficult to implement and 
may introduce high overheads. Furthermore, this approach requires 
coordination among all intermediate routers along the network.  
3.2.3 SIP intrusion detection 
SIP intrusion detection has been studied by many researchers [76] 
[57] [77]  [78] [79] [80] [81] [82]. This involves having a detection 
component to distinguish a SIP flooding traffic from normal SIP 
requests.  The advantage of SIP intrusion detection mechanisms is that 
they do not typically require collaboration of a large number of hosts, 
which makes the implementation easier.  
The most commonly used techniques in SIP intrusion detections 
are: a state machine-based detection engine, and a request header 
examine engine. An example of a request header examination is to use 
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hop-count information; the other technique is to use the attack traffic 
profile to identify the difference between attack traffic and normal 
traffic, thus limiting the attack traffic.  
3.2.3.1 Use of a finite-state-machine to identify a SIP 
flood attack 
H. Sengar et al. [80] proposed a VoIP intrusion detection 
mechanism through an interacting protocol state machine. In this 
approach, a finite state machine is used to record the status of the 
current SIP message transaction. An attack is detected if the SIP 
request received is not expected. Figure 19 shows the basic concept of 
this approach.  
 
 
Figure 19: use of a finite state machine to identify SIP flood 
attacks 
 
This approach is effective because SIP message flows have 
certain patterns. Any flow that does not follow the pattern is 
recognized as attack traffic. Every time a new session request is 
 43 
received, the intrusion detection engine initiates a new flow pattern for 
it. This process is very computationally intensive. Chen [81] also 
proposed a similar but simpler approach to detect DoS attacks on the 
SIP system in which the intrusion detection engine checks each 
incoming SIP message and, if it has a new session ID, the engine will 
increment its error count. When the error count reaches a threshold, a 
flooding attack is assumed. When an attack is detected, the system can 
generate temporarily unavailable responses to incoming requests.  
A finite state machine is complicated to implement and, since 
each state of the single session would be monitored and recorded, it 
consumes a significant amount of computational and memory resource 
which would make the system more vulnerable to flooding attacks. 
Furthermore, this approach can help to detect a SIP flooding attack, 
but it cannot reduce the effect of a SIP flooding attack.  
3.2.3.2 Use of Hop-count information to identify illegal 
SIP requests 
Hop-count information resides in the IP header, which is used to 
prevent endless circulation of IP packets. The time-to-live (TTL) field 
in the IP header specifies how many hops this packet is allowed to 
travel. Whenever the packet passes through a router, this value is 
decremented. When this value reaches 0, this packet will be dropped. 
Thus, the TTL fields directly indicate the distance of the source host. 
Haining Wang et al. [56] proposed a novel solution to mitigate spoof 
IP packets attacks  based on the hop-count of incoming IP packets and 
their source IP address. In this approach, the router that is one hop 
away from the application server is in charge of checking the hop-
count for all incoming requests. That router would firstly build a hop-
count table, containing hop-count information on all possible 
destinations. For example, if a host from network 192.168.1.0/24 is 8 
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hops away from the server, Hc = 8. When an incoming request is 
received, the router first looks at its TTL and network address. If this 
network address has the same TTL as in the table, the request is 
processed, otherwise it is dropped. Figure 20 shows the hop count 
check algorithm. 
 
Figure 20: Hop-count check algorithm. 
 
This algorithm has been shown to be capable of discarding 90% 
of the spoofed IP packets [56].  
You et al. [79] proposed a fast DDoS attack detection based on 
checking the TTL value in order to spot abnormal spikes on the 
incoming traffic. In this approach, all traffic that goes to an application 
server should have TTL with normal distribution. However, in the 
flooding attack scenario, attack traffic is likely to be generated by a 
single host and so the TTL is the same from all incoming packet. Thus, 
by monitoring the hop counts of incoming request, flooding attack 
would be detected. This approach is very simple, yet effective.  
In order to generate a complete hop number table, thousands of 
addresses and hop counts have to be stored. When the number of 
entries increases, it becomes more difficult to find a particular network 
hop number. Additionally, hop count information is only accurate in 
For each packet: 
  Extract the final TTL Tf and the source IP 
address S; 
  Compute the hop-count Hc = Ti –Tf; 
  Index S so get the stored hop-count Hs; 
  If (Hc not equal to Hs) 
The packet is spoofed; 
  Else  
    The packet is legitimate 
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connection oriented connections for example, TCP. However, most of 
the VoIP traffic is carried by UDP, thus it is not very useful any more.  
3.2.3.3 Use of a traffic profile to identify SIP flood traffic 
Reynolds et al [78] proposed a multi-layered protection for IP 
telephony. This approach is based on the theory that a SIP INVITE 
request would finally trigger an OK response, thus in the long run, the 
total number of INVITEs received by the SIP proxy server, should be 
similar to the number of OK messages. In this approach, an application 
layer attack sensor is implemented to detect a SIP DDoS attack. The 
sensor is used to record the number of INVITE and OK messages from 
each URI. If the number difference between the pair is too large, 
DDoS attack is detected, and a “service temporarily unavailable” is 
generated to the host. This approach is too simple, and rather than 
preventing them can be easily used to cause spoofed DoS attacks on 
individual hosts.  
Fowler et al. [77] propose a DDoS defending mechanism in an 
MPLS-based wireless network. In this approach, the pushback 
mechanism during congestion is used to identify a malicious host. 
However, this DDoS detection only works if the attackers use real IP 
addresses. If the DDoS packets use spoofed IP addresses, it is 
impossible to spot the attacker. An interesting aspect of this approach, 
however, is that multimedia traffic was given higher priority; this 
demonstrated that queuing is helpful to reduce the impact of a DDoS 
attack.  
Overall, while a SIP intrusion detection mechanism is able to 
inform a system administrator when an attack has been detected, it will  
already have had an impact on the SIP system. Also, current detection 
mechanisms are either too complicated, requiring a lot of 
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computational resources (for example, a finite state machine), or too 
simple and hence ineffective. 
3.2.4 SIP flood prevention 
Instead of attempting to counter a DoS attack after its detection, 
a better approach is to prevent the occurrence of SIP flood attacks in 
the first place. Attack prevention is said to be one of the most effective 
defence approaches for DoS attacks that use spoofed traffic [83]. In 
this section, we will discuss two effective SIP flood prevention 
mechanisms: the predictive-nonce approach [84]  and layer-3 queuing 
[85]. 
3.2.4.1 Predictive-nonce for mitigating SIP flood 
As mentioned earlier, using SIP digest authentication can make a SIP 
proxy more vulnerable to SIP flooding attacks as a result of the need to 
use RAM to store the generated nonce.  Rosenberg et al. [84] propose 
a predictive nonce (p-nonce) solution to overcome this weakness. This 
approach proposes that the proxy server should generate a nonce based 
on the SIP header fields that do not change within the same session. 
The nonce is generated through a cryptographic secret function over 
the session‟s unique field. Figure 21 illustrates the SIP predictive 
nonce challenge process.  
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Figure 21: Process of SIP predictive nonce checking 
When the request with the authorization header arrives, the 
server recomputes the nonce using the same set of headers in the same 
way. If the headers have not changed, the resulting nonce will be 
identical to the one issued in the challenge, and the digest response 
will be valid. If any of the header fields have been changed by an 
attacker, the nonce that is computed will be different, the server will 
detect this condition, and the request will be rejected. This approach 
can be used to eliminate spoofed SIP flooding traffic, as the attacker 
using spoofed source IP addresses will not be able to receive the nonce.  
The advantage of this approach is that it is able to prevent SIP 
flooding attacks. This approach enforces the use of the three-way 
handshake, which means spoofed SIP flooding attacks will not succeed. 
Furthermore, it does not occupy the scarce RAM resource on the SIP 
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proxy server to store the generated nonce value. Thus it should provide 
a better performance than the traditional SIP authentication process. 
The drawback to this mechanism is that the approach requires 
authentication for each request, and the computation process is very 
intensive, as each verification process requires duo-computation (one 
to calculate nonce, one to calculate the response). In order to achieve 
the level of throughput on a traditional authentication-enabled SIP 
system, the SIP proxy server has to have higher processing power.   
3.2.4.2 Queuing mechanism to prevent flooding attacks 
Various researchers [77] [85] [86] have shown that the effect of a 
flood-based DoS attack can be reduced if the system has a good 
queuing mechanism.  
Ohta  [85] studied the performance of a SIP signalling network in 
an overload condition and proposed improving the performance of the 
network by implementing a better queuing mechanism. In this 
approach two FIFO queues are implemented, one to handle SIP 
INVITE requests and the other is used to handle all other messages. 
The SIP INVITE queue was given a lower priority. The performance 
of a single FIFO queue and a two class priority queue are compared 
using Network Simulator 2. The research demonstrated the 
performance of the network under the two scenarios, and verified with 
a two class priority queue, that the performance of the system was 
improved.  
The most significant advantage of layer-3 queues is their high 
speed because there is no application processing involved. 
Additionally, they can be implemented on the firewall relatively easily 
thus offloading work from the SIP server.  However, this approach is 
too simple as it just distinguishes and assigns lower priority to SIP 
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INVITE requests. This makes the system more vulnerable to other 
flooding attacks. For example, if an attacker floods the server with 
ACK packets, then the call setup time for the legitimate user will be 
increased. 
3.2.4.3 Two layer DoS prevention on the SIP VoIP 
infrastructure 
Ehlert et al [87] proposed a SIP DoS solution, which consists of 
two main components: an IDS enabled firewall; and an enhanced SIP 
proxy server. This system is designed to defeat SIP flooding, 
malformed message attack as well as DNS DoS attack. The IDS 
monitors incoming traffic and triggers an alert if the incoming traffic 
reaches a threshold (e.g. 100 INVITEs per minute). In this case the 
cache only answers requests from its stored content, and returns an 
unresolvable message for any request that cannot be answered directly 
from the cache. The SIP proxy server has a module built-in to examine 
the content of a SIP message header to spot malformed SIP requests.  
This system is ineffective if the flood packets are well-formed 
and use randomly spoofed source IP addresses.  
3.2.5 SIP flood mitigation summary 
The existing SIP flood mitigation provides some partial solution 
for SIP DoS attacks. However, they all have their own limitations and 
can hardly be used as a final solution for SIP DoS attacks. Table 3 
summarises the advantages and disadvantages of all these solutions.  
 
Table 3: Existing SIP flood mitigation techniques 
 
 
Mitigation 
 
Advantages 
 
Disadvantages 
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Technique 
 
Firewall 
 Relatively easy to 
implement; 
 Firewall avoids the 
necessity of having to 
rely on user cooperation 
and responsibility. 
 
 Cannot protect against 
attacks from internal 
network; 
 Our experiments shows 
the security on firewall 
can be defeated; 
Router-
based 
approach 
 Has the potential to 
stop attacks at an early 
stage, thus minimizing 
the effect of them; 
 Some techniques help 
to eliminate the impact of 
DoS attacks totally 
(attacker traceback); 
 Requires ubiquitous 
adoption and coordination 
among different routers, 
which makes the 
implementation difficult; 
 Some approaches 
requires coordination 
among all intermediate 
routers along the network, 
which makes them 
impractical (attacker 
traceback); 
 Some approaches 
would cause an excessive 
amount of useless 
information to be stored at 
the router and slow the 
lookup process down; 
 
Intrusion 
Detection 
 Helps to spot attack 
traffic at real-time, so 
further anti-flood 
mechanisms can be 
triggered to stop the 
attacks; 
 It does not provide 
mechanisms to stop the 
attack traffic; 
 Normally when the 
attack is detected, it is too 
late already; 
 This is only a partial 
solution to SIP flood 
attacks; 
 Some intrusion 
detection mechanisms can 
be very complicated and 
require a large amount of 
computation power (finite 
state machine approach) 
 Some require the router 
to store a large amount of 
information, which can 
slow down the matching 
process (hop-count 
approach); 
 
Intrusion 
Prevention 
 This is considered to 
be the most effective SIP 
flood mitigation 
approach; 
 Some approaches can 
 Some of the 
approaches are very 
processing intensive 
and are relatively 
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eliminate the impact of 
SIP flood attacks 
(predictive nonce 
approach); 
 Some approaches can 
reduce the impact of SIP 
flood attacks (layer-3 
queuing approach);  
slow (predictive 
nonce approach); 
 Some approaches 
just provide partial 
solutions; 
 None of the existing 
approaches can help 
to eliminate the 
impact of SIP flood 
attack, while 
maintaining a good 
QoS for legitimate 
users; 
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Chapter 4: Security-enhanced SIP system 
(SESS)  
In this chapter we propose a security-enhanced SIP system 
(SESS) consisting of a security enhanced SIP proxy server and an 
enhanced application layer stateless firewall [64].  The basic concept 
of SESS is to maintain in both the firewall and the SIP server the 
addresses of known (legitimate) users in order to give them priority 
handling.  The enhanced SIP proxy server updates the firewall with the 
IP addresses of legitimate users and alerts the firewall when a 
legitimate user IP address expires and should be removed from the list. 
An enhanced firewall adjusts its rules according to the information fed 
by the enhanced SIP proxy server, and enforces advanced predictive 
nonce checking on unknown users. Additionally, a new protocol called 
Known Address Synchronization Protocol (KASP) is proposed to 
manage the update of legitimate user information between the security 
enhanced SIP proxy server and the reactive firewall.  
4.1 Related work 
Ohta [85] has studied the performance of a SIP signalling 
network in an overload condition and proposes a mechanism to 
improve the performance of VoIP by giving the  INVITE message 
lower priority. The performance of a FIFO queue and a two class 
priority queue are compared. However, this queuing mechanism is 
simple, and it does not protect the system from SIP flooding attacks.  
Studies have shown that to a web service the difference between 
a very busy day and a DDoS attack is that in a very busy day, 82.9% of 
the IP addresses have appeared at the web site before. However, in a 
DDoS attack event only 0.6-14% of the IP addresses have appeared 
before [88]. We can assume this statistic would be more extreme on a 
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VoIP server, because people tend to call the same destination over and 
over again. Researchers [89]  [70] have proposed history-based IP 
filtering to mitigate flooding attacks. Peng [85] considers an IP address 
to be legitimate if it can satisfy two rules: it appeared for „d‟ days, and 
there are „n‟ packets transmitted using this IP address. When the edge 
router is overloaded, it will only admit “legitimate” packets through. 
The advantages of this approach are that the scheme is robust, does not 
need the cooperation of the whole Internet community, is applicable to 
a wide variety of traffic types and requires little configuration. 
Furthermore, it uses a list to store legitimate user addresses, so when 
the system is under a DDoS attack, the service performance of 
legitimate users can be guaranteed. However, when the system is 
overloaded, packets whose IP addresses that are not on the legitimate 
user list will be dropped, resulting in the risk that a legitimate user 
could be refused service. 
D‟Souza et al. [90] propose a method to mitigate spoofed packet 
attacks which also takes advantage of an IP history. In their approach, 
a packet classification engine is used to match the source IP addresses 
of the incoming packets with a list of “known” hosts. The “known” 
hosts are then queued to a higher priority queue. After an “unknown” 
host is authenticated, it will be put in the trust list, and its packets will 
be promoted into the higher priority queue. D‟Souza does not explain 
how “known” traffic is determined.  
SESS extends and integrates the solutions proposed by Peng and 
D‟Souza, resulting in a system which consists of three components: a 
security-enhanced SIP server, a security-enhanced firewall, and a new 
protocol called “Known Address Synchronisation Protocol” (KASP) 
which is used to carry the legitimate user notifications.  
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4.2 Overview of the proposed solution 
In a SIP-based VoIP system, a “known host” based priority 
queuing mechanism can be very helpful in defending against DDoS 
attacks because:  
 People tend to call the same destination all the time, 
which means the SIP proxy server is likely in any reasonable time 
period to receive requests from the same clients. By recording the 
legitimate source IP over a long period, the proxy server would  
have an almost complete list of legitimate users that would place a 
phone call.  
 In SIP, it is reasonably easy to determine a valid user as 
the SIP call setup is a handshake process and it cannot be 
completed with spoofed IP. Thus, we can assume all IP addresses 
that have completed a handshake are legitimate, which includes all 
users that have successfully registered or made a phone call. 
While the concept of a known user list will work for SIP, it 
would be reasonable to assume that application of the service would 
benefit from having more frequent users given higher priority for SIP 
service, especially when the server is under heavy DDoS attack.  
Consequently, we propose building on Ohta‟s work by implementing a 
dual-stage priority list.  
The IP addresses of a SIP client host will normally be assigned 
by DHCP[91] and so may change. Consequently, we propose that the 
“known host” list should have an expiry time in order to remove 
potentially obsolete addresses and to keep the known host list at a 
manageable size.  Further, the application of a protection mechanism 
using the IP list requires that the list be synchronised at both the 
firewall and the SIP server, and so we propose a new Known Address 
Synchronisation Protocol (KASP).  
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Figure 22 illustrates the overall operation of the security 
enhanced SIP system (SESS). 
 
Figure 22: Overall process of Security-enhanced SIP proxy server 
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will authenticate the source by using improved predictive nonce 
checking (this will be explained in section 4.4.1). If not, it will just 
forward the request to the SIP proxy server. After the sender is 
authenticated, the re-INVITE and re-REGISTER will be passed to the 
SIP proxy server.  
The SIP proxy server then would proxy the request to the callee. 
When the callee picks up the phone, a 200OK response is sent back to 
the caller via the proxy server. As soon as the caller receives the 
200OK response, an ACK request is generated to inform the SIP proxy 
server and the callee about the success of the session setup.  
When the SIP proxy server receives the ACK request, it knows 
the call setup three-way handshake is finished. At this point it has been 
established that the caller is a legitimate user. Thus, the SIP proxy 
server will extract the source IP address and record it in the legitimate 
user list. Following this, the SIP proxy server will update the firewall 
with the changes on the legitimate user list.  
After the firewall receives the updates on the legitimate user list, 
it will convert those updates to iptables rules sets and issue them to the 
kernel iptables module.  
4.3 Security-enhanced SIP proxy server 
The security-enhanced SIP proxy server is used to record the 
source IP addresses of legitimate users, send these addresses to the 
firewall, remove the users from legitimate user lists when the entry 
expires, and update the firewall with the expiry alert. The reason we 
have chosen to have the SIP proxy server record the IP addresses 
rather than the firewall is because the SIP proxy server would process 
SIP requests anyway and so recording the source IP field of a SIP 
message in an internal list would barely use any extra computational 
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power, so the performance of the proxy would not be significantly 
affected. However if extra application-layer processes are added to a 
firewall, the performance of the firewall would be much more 
significantly affected. Figure 23 illustrates the security operation on 
the security-enhanced SIP proxy server. 
   
Figure 23: security operation on the security-enhanced SIP proxy 
server. 
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As an extension to Souza[90], the proposed project uses a two-
stage list instead of a single list. This allows legitimate users to be 
differentiated into two groups – occasional legitimate users, and 
frequent legitimate users who make more frequent phone calls. We 
suggest that frequent users should be assigned a higher priority.  
Legitimate users are defined as users who have successfully 
placed a call. It is important to know that a successful registration does 
not guarantee the user is an authorized user, because registration is not 
a three-way handshake process.  
As mentioned earlier, a call setup process is a complete three-
way handshake and detection of an ACK request signifies the success 
of the process. Thus, when an ACK message is received, the proxy 
server can record the source IP address as a legitimate user. Legitimate 
user IP addresses are recorded into one of two lists (userlist and a 
frequent userlist) depending on how frequently the user uses the 
system.  
When an ACK request is received by the proxy server, the proxy 
server will extract the source IP address of the request, and search 
through the frequent userlist and userlist, to see if this user is already 
on one of them. If this is a new user, the address will be added to the 
normal userlist and a timer will be set to remove the user on expiry 
after time t1. A KASP message will then be sent to the firewall to 
notify the addition of a normal user.  
If the user is already on the frequent userlist, the firewall will just 
reset the last-seen timer for that user.  
If the user is on the userlist, the firewall will check the time 
difference between this and the previous call. If it is less than the 
frequent user expiry time t2 the user will be promoted from the normal 
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list to the frequent userlist, and the firewall will be notified of the 
change.  
If the user is on the userlist, while the time difference between 
this and the last call is greater than t2, the proxy server will just update 
the timer.  
When a user on the frequent userlist expires, it will be removed 
from the frequent userlist, and be added to the userlist. A KASP 
message will be sent to the firewall to update the changes.  
When a user is expired from the userlist, it will be removed from 
the userlist. The next time this user makes a phone call via the SIP 
server, it will have to go through the predictive nonce checking 
process again.  
4.4 Known address synchronization protocol 
(KASP) 
KASP is used to transmit the updates of legitimate user lists from 
the SIP proxy server to the firewall using UDP. The reason to use UDP 
over TCP is that TCP is a connection oriented protocol which would 
need a three-way-handshake to establish a session before the data is 
transmitted. While TCP has better security than UDP, since the 
information update happens between a SIP proxy server and a firewall 
which is normally one hop away from the server, and given that the 
communication link is secured by the firewall, there is no real benefit 
to be gained from the security advantage of TCP. Additionally, as the 
update happens relatively frequently and the payload is small, it is very 
inefficient to go through the handshake process on each update.  
Figure 24 shows the structure of a sample KASP message.   
IP Header UDP Header KASP:+fu10.0.0.34 
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Figure 24: Sample KASP message 
 
The first four characters in a KASP packet indicate this is a 
KASP message. The plus and minus indicate whether to add or remove 
a user, followed by two characters to indicate to which list this packet 
refers, and the rest of the message contains the IP address that is to be 
added/removed from the list.  
4.5 Security-enhanced firewall 
The security-enhanced firewall categorizes packets into three 
categories: frequent users, normal users and unknown users. 
Correspondingly, there are three queues on the firewall, namely: high-
priority queue, normal queue and suspicious queue. Packets from 
hosts that are on the “frequent user list” will be put in the “high-
priority” queue, if the packets are from a “user list”, they will be put 
into the “normal” queue. And if the source IP of the packets is not on 
the lists, they will be put into the “suspicious” queue. Packets in the 
high priority queue will have the highest priority, followed by the 
normal queue, and they will be directly forwarded through the firewall 
to the server. Packets that are on the suspicious queue will be passed to 
the firewall‟s upper layer to be authenticated using the improved 
predictive nonce checking mechanism. In the following section, the 
improved predictive nonce checking mechanism will be discussed in 
detail. 
In the initial approach, this project proposed an application-layer 
stateless firewall [64]. As an extension to the predictive nonce 
checking mechanism [84], we propose as an initial approach that the 
predictive nonce checking should be located on an application layer 
stateless firewall and the procedure should be simpler than that 
proposed in [84]. 
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It is useful to put predictive nonce checking on the firewall 
because at a service provider level we can assume that the bandwidth 
at the firewall is normally much greater than that at the server, thus it 
is better to stop the flooding packets there before they reach the server. 
Furthermore, a proxy server is normally responsible for many tasks, 
e.g: callee address resolution, registration, SIP message routing and 
thus is generally subject to higher per-transaction processing loads 
than the firewall.    
We propose an improved predictive nonce checking mechanism, 
which simplifies the predictive nonce checking process to avoid the 
firewall having to retain a copy of legitimate usernames and passwords.  
4.5.1   Improved predictive nonce checking and the 
application-layer stateless firewall 
This section details the improved predictive nonce checking 
mechanisms and the initially proposed application-layer stateless 
firewall.   
There is a unique field (nonce) in the SIP 401 (Unauthorized) 
and 407 (Authentication Required) messages to avoid replay attacks.  
A nonce is a server-specified data string which should be uniquely 
generated each time a 401 or 407 response is made. The nonce is 
generated as a result of cryptographic function over some session-
unique header fields plus other fields and a secret that is only known 
by the firewall, for example: callID, source IP address, and a secret. 
By doing this, the firewall does not have to record the nonces with 
corresponding callIDs. Next time, when the re-request message arrives, 
the firewall can recalculate the nonce on the fly based on the received 
SIP header fields. By comparing the recalculated nonce with the 
received nonce, if they match, the user is a legitimate user.  
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Figure 25: Call setup process with application-layer stateless 
firewall. 
 
 
Figure 26: How an INVITE request is handled 
 
Figure 25 shows the call setup process with firewall 
authentication using predictive nonce checking, and figure 26 shows 
the flow diagram of the handling of an INVITE message. 
 When a message arrives at port 5060, the firewall checks if it is an 
INVITE or REGISTER message. If not, the message is allowed to 
pass through. 
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 If the message is INVITE/REGISTER, the firewall will check the 
SIP header, looking for a “nonce” value. 
 If the incoming SIP request does not have one, the firewall 
generates a nonce value. This is the result of a cryptographic secret 
function computed over the CallID and source IP address which 
ensures that the nonce is unique for each session, as a new CallID 
is generated when a session is initiated.  Figure 27 shows how the 
nonce is calculated. 
 
 
Figure 27: The generation of the nonce  
 
 The firewall will then send back a 407/401 (Authentication 
Required/Unauthorized) message to the client, with the calculated 
nonce value. Then the firewall will drop the session.   
 After the client receives a 407/401 message, it resends an INVITE 
message with the same CallID, server-specified nonce, username 
and password. 
 When the firewall receives an INVITE with a nonce value, it will 
recalculate a nonce value based on CallID and source IP address 
and compare it with the received nonce.  
 If the nonce matches, the request is allowed to pass through to the 
server.  
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 For better security, the cryptographic secret should be changed 
after a small period of time, e.g. 30 seconds. (an overlap for 2 
successive secrets should be allowed) 
It is worth noting that this firewall should pass all other SIP messages 
through in order to complete the session setup or teardown process. 
4.5.1.1 Advantages 
The advantages of the improved predictive nonce checking are as 
follows:  
 It can protect the server from Spoofed SIP INVITE and 
REGISTER flooding attacks. 
 Stateless authentication --The firewall does not need to 
store multiple CallID and nonce entries in a database. This protects 
the firewall from RAM exhaustion during a flooding attack.  
4.5.1.2 Drawbacks 
The drawbacks of the improved predictive nonce checking are as 
follows:  
 There is a lack of kernel support as the predictive nonce 
checking is not native to the iptables firewall leading to slower 
than desired processing.   
 The IPQueue module is used to pass the packets from 
the network interface to the application process, where the 
IPQueue is a single FIFO queue and the next packet is not passed 
until the first packet is processed. Consequently, in the event of a 
flooding attack, the call setup delay increases significantly.  
 This approach is not able to block other SIP message 
flood traffic other than INVITE and REGISTER floods. However, 
since other SIP messages would not require much processing from 
the SIP proxy server, this is of relatively low concern.  
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4.5.1.3 Tests and results 
In order to test how well this stateless firewall combats the SIP 
flooding traffic, and to verify our assumption above, a series of tests 
were carried out using the same testbed which was used for the 
previous firewalled experiments. 
The firewall [64]  used in this experiment is the stateless 
predictive nonce checking firewall. It is implemented in conjunction 
with my colleague Isaac Lee. Figure 28 shows the structure of this 
firewall. 
 
Figure 28: Predictive nonce checking firewall structure 
 
 It is based on an Iptables firewall, and uses IPQUEUE to pass 
each request from the network interface to the application-layer. It is 
important to note that IPQUEUE contains a single FIFO queue to pass 
all relevant packets to the application layer. Thus, when this system is 
under flooding attack, it might slow down the call setup process for 
legitimate users as well. After the packets have arrived at the 
application layer, the application layer application will process the 
request as specified in figure 24.  
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For the purpose of determining the optimum rate of flooding 
traffic, the maximum speed of the test bed network used in this 
experiment needs to be calculated. Initially, the call setup delay is 
monitored when the system is operating with the firewall but without 
nonce checking.  
Then using the predictive nonce-checking firewall, the total 
number of received attack packets are recorded to calculate the 
percentage of the attack traffic that managed to navigate through the 
firewall and the client call setup delay was measured to verify the 
system performance impact of this firewall.  
By comparing these two sets of experimental results, we can 
establish the efficiency of the application-layer stateless firewall.  
We flooded the SIP proxy server, with no security, and verified 
with burst flood mode, that the average packets received by the server 
were 3229 packets per second. Thus, using 1000 packets per chunk 
with one second delays between chunks as our attack rate would be a 
suitable choice, as it provides a minimum packet loss rate.  
Figure 29 illustrates the CPU usage diagram on the SIP proxy 
server, when using the application-layer stateless firewall. 
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Figure 29: The CPU usage of the SIP proxy server during an 
INVITE flood attack 
Figure 29 shows that during an INVITE flood attack the SIP 
proxy server is not affected. This verifies that the application-layer 
stateless firewall is able to block all spoofed INVITE and REGISTER 
packets. Figure 30 compares the call setup delays when the system is 
operating with the stateless firewall but without predictive nonce 
checking.  
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Figure 30: Comparison of call setup delays for stateless firewall 
and “no security” when the system is under INVITE flood at the 
rate of 1000 packets per chunk, one second delay. 
The pink spikes in figure 30 represent call setup timeout. We can 
see the application-layer stateless firewall helps to eliminates call 
setup timeouts. This is because call setup timeouts are caused by SIP 
proxy processing power exhaustion. As there is no impact on the 
server, no call setup delays occur. 
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4.5.1.4 Analysis and Conclusion 
From figure 30 we can see that the average call setup delay under 
an INVITE flood in an unsecured system is 9.39 seconds (call setup 
timeouts are not included in the calculation). This delay is caused by 
SIP proxy process delay. When using the application-layer stateless 
firewall system the average call setup delay is decreased by 25% (7.08 
seconds), and this is mainly caused by the queuing and authentication 
process of the firewall.  
While the use of application-layer stateless firewall can eliminate 
call setup timeouts and reduce the call setup delay by a quarter of that 
under no security, there is still a significant call setup delay. This 
confirms that the predictive nonce checking causes significant delays 
in the call setup process under flooding attack. This is because 
predictive nonce checking is not native to a system, so there is no 
kernel support, and a single FIFO queue is used to pass all SIP 
INVITE and REGISTER packets from the network interface to the 
application-layer process which makes the setup delay increase as the 
number of attack packets increases.   
In order to achieve good service performance for a legitimate 
user when under a flooding attack, the proposed improved predictive 
nonce checking mechanism has to be used in conjunction with SESS.  
 
4.6 Advantages and Drawbacks of SESS 
The advantages of SESS are:  
 Good attack block success rate: In theory, it is able to 
block all SIP INVITE and REGISTER floods. 
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 High QoS for legitimate users: Even when the system 
is under severe INVITE or REGISTER flooding attack, the QoS of 
legitimate users is still maintained at a good level.  
The disadvantage of SESS is that it can only block INVITE and 
REGISTER flooding attacks. It does not have a way to block other SIP 
request flooding.  
Chapter 5 of this document proposes an improved SESS (ISESS) 
which is able to block the majority types of spoofed SIP flooding 
requests, for example INVITE, REGISTER, ACK, and CANCEL 
floods etc.  
4.6 Improved security-enhanced SIP system 
(ISESS) 
As mentioned in last section, even though SESS is able to defeat 
SIP INVITE and REGISTER flooding attacks to provide a good QoS 
for legitimate users it was not able to block some other types of SIP 
request flood attacks. Consequently, an improved security-enhanced 
SIP system (ISESS) was designed which adds protection for all types 
of SIP requests flooding.  
4.6.1 Overview of the improved security-enhanced SIP 
system 
Figure 31 illustrates the process of this system, followed by a detailed 
explanation.  
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Figure 31: the improved security-enhanced SIP system 
In ISESS, the firewall will drop all SIP request messages except 
INVITE and REGISTER from an unknown user until such time as the 
user has been successfully authenticated using an INVITE or 
REGISTER. For known users, the process in this system is the same as 
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that in SESS, i.e. requests will be passed to the proxy server directly 
through iptables. Entries on the frequent user list, normal user list and 
temporary user list will be removed on expiry. 
 
For unknown users, however, the system will do the following:  
 When the request arrives at the firewall, it will check to 
see if it is an INVITE or REGISTER. If so, the firewall will 
perform the predictive nonce checking authentication as explained 
in section 4.4.1. If the packet is another SIP request, the firewall 
will drop it. This ensures no spoofed SIP requests are passed 
through the firewall. 
 When the INVITE message arrives at the SIP proxy, 
since the packet has already passed the authentication checks on 
the firewall, the SIP proxy does not have to challenge it again.  
Once the SIP Proxy receives a message, it does the following: 
 The SIP proxy will firstly check if the source IP address 
is already on the userlist or frequent userlist, if so, the server will 
process it in the same way as in SESS.  
 If it is not on any lists, the SIP proxy will temporarily 
add the source IP address to its temporary user list for 30 seconds 
(the reason for choosing 30 seconds is that it is a typical waiting 
time before an unanswered phone is directed to voicemail). Within 
the 30 seconds, if the callee answers the phone, the OK and ACK 
messages will be exchanged.  
 When the server receives the ACK, the user will be 
moved from the temporary user list to the userlist that has been 
specified in section 4.3. After the user is added to the userlist, a 
KASP message will be sent to the firewall to update the changes 
on the userlist, and the process is the same as SESS.  
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Using this process, all legitimate users will continue to receive 
the same performance as that in SESS, while all forms of SIP request 
flooding will be blocked by the firewall.  
4.6.2 ISESS analysis 
ISESS is an advance on SESS by eliminating other types of SIP 
request flooding attacks while maintaining good QoS for legitimate 
users. This is for the following reasons: 
Only INVITE and REGISTER requests are allowed from 
unknown users: By using this filtering rule at the firewall, other types 
of SIP requests can be eliminated.    
The use of a temporary user list ensures that unknown legitimate 
users can become authenticated without any difficulties. 
The firewall queuing, userlist and frequent userlist update 
mechanisms are the same as in SESS, which maintains a good QoS for 
legitimate users during flood attacks.  
Chapter 6 of this document will explain the implementation of 
SESS and ISESS followed by experiments to examine their 
performances.  
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Chapter 5: Implementation and test results 
This chapter explains the implementation procedure of the 
proposed SESS and ISESS. After implementing the systems, a series 
of experiments are conducted to verify the performance of each system 
under SIP DoS attacks. The performance metrics used in the 
experiments are mainly call setup delays for different types of users 
(unknown, normal and frequent users) and CPU usages on both SIP 
proxy server and the firewall during an attack. The experiment results 
should show that when using SESS and ISESS, during an INVITE or 
REGISTER flooding attack the call setup delays for normal users and 
frequent users should not be affected by the attack, while the call setup 
delay for unknown users should be longer than usual, as it has to go 
through layer-7 authentication process. ACK flooding attacks will be 
conducted to examine whether SESS is vulnerable to other type of SIP 
request flooding attacks. We can expect that during an ACK flooding 
attack, the call setup delay for all users under SESS will increase 
dramatically. When ISESS is configured, during other types of SIP 
flooding attacks, we can expect that no discernable effect will be 
observed. This chapter details the way the experiments are conducted, 
followed by some systematic analysis of the experimental results. 
5.1 Implementation of SESS 
5.1.1 Security-enhanced SIP proxy server 
5.1.1.1 Choice of implementation platform 
The enhanced SIP proxy server is implemented in Java using 
JAIN SLEE [92].  The reason for choosing JAIN SLEE [92] is that it 
is designed for telecommunication‟s low latency and high throughput 
environments (10-20 calls per second per CPU; ~10 events per call; 
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<200ms RTT) [93]. It also enables easy integration of new capabilities 
using a high level language - Java. Jain SLEE is one of the most 
advanced network service environments available for network service 
development.  
5.1.1.2 Implementation details 
When implementing security-enhanced SIP proxy server, the SIP 
service component on JAIN SLEE server, called SIP Service Building 
Block is modified. Each incoming ACK message is logged and the IP 
address of the sender of this message is stored on one of the user list, 
depending on the time it made the last phone call. Hashtables are used 
to store the legitimate user IP addresses. There are two static 
hashtables created: frequentuserlist, and userlist. User source IP 
addresses are used as hashtable keys, and user objects are stored as 
hashtable values.  
The main Java objects created are as follows:  
 A user object is created, which contains three attributes: a user 
source IP, a timer object, and a current time when the user request 
is handled.  
 Timer objects are in charge of expiring the entry on its list. When 
the entry expires, the timer object will call a timer task object, 
which will perform a user removal action. If the user is removed 
from a frequentuserlist, it will be added to the userlist. If a user is 
removed from the userlist, the user will be considered to be 
unknown when they next make a phone call. The frequentuserlist 
has a shorter life cycle than the userlist. In the testbed environment, 
the frequetuserlist is set to expire after 10 minutes, and the userlist 
to expire after 15 minutes.  
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When a user completes the INVITE three-way handshake, the 
proxy server will carry out the enhanced security process as described 
previously.  
Figure 32 shows the pseudo code of the userlist class. 
 
Figure 32: the pseudo code of the userlist class. 
 
Figure 33 illustrates the pseudo code of the remove user process. 
 
 
Figure 33: the remove user process. 
If (user is already on the frequentuserlist) { 
 Update timer; 
}or if (user is on the userlist) { 
 If (Timedifference < frequentuserlist expire time) { 
  Userlist.remove (user); 
  Frequentuserlist.put(user); 
              reset userTimer to frequentuserTImer; 
  notify firewall about the change; 
 }or else{ 
  Reset userTimer to userTimer; 
 } 
}or else { 
 Userlist.put (user); 
 Notify firewall of the addition of user; 
 Set timer to userTimer; 
} 
 
Remove user (userIP, which list it is on, timer) { 
 If (the user is on the frequentuserlist) { 
  Frequentuserlist.remove(userIP) ; 
  Userlist.put(userIP, user); 
  Notify firewall; 
 )or if (the user is on the userlist) { 
  Userlist.remove(userIP); 
  Notify firewall; 
 } 
} 
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If the user is removed from the frequentuserlist, it will be added 
to the userlist, and a demotion notification will be sent to the firewall. 
If the user is removed from the userlist, notification of removal will be 
sent to the firewall.  
When the firewall receives a notification, it will map the 
notification to an iptables rule. The next section will explain how this 
is done.  
5.1.2 Implementation of the security enhanced firewall 
The security enhanced firewall is implemented using a standard 
linux iptables firewall. Iptables rule sets are a true layer-three process 
with no application layer processing required, and this ensures optimal 
performance of the system. This section explains how the firewall is 
implemented.  
5.1.2.1 DNAT and regular housekeeping 
The first requirement for the firewall is to enable destination 
network address translation (DNAT), and do regular SIP firewall setup. 
DNAT is used to prevent exposure of the SIP proxy private address. 
All requests that are received at the firewall‟s external interface on 
port 5060 will be forwarded to the SIP proxy. This is done by using 
the iptables DNAT rule set, eg:  
iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -p tcp -i eth0 -d 
10.0.0.1 --dport 5060 -j DNAT --to 192.168.1.62:5060 
Then, the stateless SIP firewall is set up. After DNAT, all 
incoming SIP messages will be sent to the FORWARD chain. Thus, to 
ensure all SIP packets are passed to the stateless predictive nonce 
checking, we need to specify a firewall rule set as follows: 
iptables –A FORWARD –p udp –i eth0 –d 192.168.1.62 –
-dport 5060 –j queue 
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5.1.2.2 Firewall rule set update daemon 
Updates to the rule set are achieved using a separate C daemon.  
When the daemon starts up, it should flush the current iptables rule 
sets and re-establish the predefined rules as above.  
This program then listens on the port 1117 of the firewall‟s 
internal interface (IP address: 192.168.1.1) where the userlist updates 
from the proxy server are received.  When an update packet is received, 
the daemon reads the payload and converts the KASP message to an 
iptables rule. The KASP conversion is as described in the following 
table (table 4): 
Table 4: KASP conversion details 
Bytes 
6-8 
Action Rule 
+nu INSERT ACCEPT FORWARD 
-nu DELETE ACCEPT FORWARD 
+fu INSERT ACCEPT FORWARD 
APPEND PREROUTING with TOS to 
Minimize Delay. 
-fu DELETE ACCEPT FORWARD 
DELETE PREROUTING with TOS to 
Minimize Delay. 
 
To execute the converted iptables command, use a method called 
system (command string).  
5.2 Implementation of ISESS 
SIP proxy server modification: 
When an INVITE message is received, the SIP server will first 
check to see if its source IP address is already on the userlist or 
frequent userlist. If so, do nothing. Otherwise, the server needs to add 
the IP address to a temporary user list (tempUserList), and set the 
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timer to expire in 30 seconds, and then send the updated information to 
the firewall. For simplicity, the updated information will be the KASP 
nu+ message, so we do not have to modify the firewall for a new type 
of message. When the timer expires, the user will be removed from the 
list, and a KASP nu- will be sent. These procedures are performed by a 
new method called checkUser(). Figure 34 shows the pseudo code of 
checkUser().  
 
Figure 34: Pseudo code for checkUser() 
 
In SESS, when an ACK is received from a new user it will be 
added to the userlist. In ISESS, an ACK can only be added to a userlist 
if it is already on the tempUserList. Figure 35 shows the pseudo code 
for this process.  
 
If (user is not already on the frequentuserlist && it is not on the 
userlist) { 
  
 tempUserList.put (user); 
 Notify firewall about the addition of user; 
 Set timer to 30 seconds; 
} 
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Figure 35: Pseudo code for adding user, when ACK is received. 
 
Advanced firewall modification: 
In the predictive nonce checking module, ISESS will drop any 
packet other than an INVITE and REGISTER. The rest of the program 
is the same as SESS. The iptables rule set update daemon is used to 
update new iptables rule sets for legitimate users. 
 
5.3 Test results 
A number of trials were carried out to verify the effectiveness of 
the proposed solutions, with particular emphasis on improvements in 
the performance of the application-layer stateless firewall. It is 
important to note that the test results are applicable to our testbed. The 
results may differ if tested in other systems. In the following 
experiments, for simplicity SIP INVITE flood is used in most of the 
system performance tests. This is because SIP INVITE flood is 
considered to be a more harmful SIP attack traffic, as it requires more 
If (user is already on the frequentuserlist) { 
 Update timer; 
}or if (user is on the userlist) { 
 If (Timedifference < frequentuserlist expire time) { 
  Userlist.remove (user); 
  Frequentuserlist.put(user); 
              reset userTimer to frequentuserTImer; 
  notify firewall about the change; 
 }or else{ 
  Reset userTimer to uerTimer; 
 } 
}or else { 
 Userlist.put (user); 
 Notify firewall about the addition of user; 
 Set timer to userTimer; 
} 
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processing power to process. As stated in section 1.1, the objective of 
this project is to find a solution that is able to stop most SIP flood 
traffic, meanwhile maintaining a good QoS for legitimate users. In 
order to verify how the proposed solutions fit the criteria, the 
following factors are measured:  
Call setup delays when the system is under SIP flood attacks are 
measured, which is an important criterion to measure the QoS of a 
telephony system.  
Call setup timeout percentage: is used to measure the 
availabilities of a system. As mentioned earlier, the general availability 
objectives of PSTN network are to achieve 99.999%, which means the 
call setup timeout has to be less than 0.001%. 
CPU usages on the firewall and SIP proxy server when the 
system is under flood attack. This helps to illustrate how moving 
authentication from the SIP proxy to the firewall can help to improve 
the performance of the system.  
Other SIP requests floods are used to verify how the proposed 
systems mitigate flooding of other types of SIP requests. For example, 
ACK, and CANCEL flood. 
It is important to note that the way the length of iptables rulesets 
affects the performance of the system is measured, however its effect 
is not significant enough, and will not be discussed in this document. 
Stress tests have been conducted with a large amount of flood traffic 
and the test results show SESS and ISESS can still provide good 
performance under this attack. Since this is not a critical examination 
factor, the details of this experiment will not be discussed. 
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5.3.1 Call setup delays for new users, normal users 
and frequent users 
This section studies the call setup delays for different users (new 
user, normal user and frequent user) under various levels of security 
(no security, stateless firewall, SESS and ISESS.  
During the experiment, a constant INVITE flood of 1000 packets 
per chunk, with one second delay was used (this specific chunk size 
and inter-chunk delay were arrived at based on intensive trial runs with 
varying sizes and delays).  During these trials, we found that if the 
attack rate is too low, there would be little impact on the performance 
of the system. If the attack rate is too high, most of the attack traffic 
will be lost due to the network congestion. With 1000 packets per 
chunk delay of one second, we are able to block all incoming calls, 
and a packet loss rate of 9.2 %., is used to stress the system. In order to 
test how the length of the two stage list may affect the performance of 
the system, 100 users were manually added to the frequentuserlist, and 
100 users to the userlist. The iptables rule sets were also updated to 
reflect these list entries. 
When the system has no security activated, or when the system is 
under the protection of the basic application-layer stateless firewall, 
there is no difference in processing each of the types of users and so 
there will be no difference in call setup delay. Thus, for both of these 
configurations, a single set of call setup delay data will suffice.  
However, with SESS and ISESS configurations, the call setup delay 
for new users, normal users and frequent users should differ and so the 
call setup delay for the three types of users is measured separately.  
Figure 36 shows the average call setup delay for different users 
under various security levels.  
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Figure 36: Average call setup delays for different users. 
 
The average call setup delay for users under no security is 9.39 
(this calculation does not include the call setup timeouts) seconds. 
With the application-layer firewall, the average call setup delay 
for users under application-layer predictive nonce checking firewall is 
measured at 7.06 seconds, which is still quite high. 
With the security enhanced SIP system (SESS), there were no 
timeouts.  The average call setup delay for new users was 7.14 seconds 
which is consistent with the application layer stateless firewall, as 
expected. However, the call setup delay was measured at 0.675 
seconds for normal users and 0.487 seconds for frequent users – a 
substantial improvement with little impact on new user call setup.  
With ISESS, the average call setup delay for new users is 8.26 
seconds, and 1.14 seconds for normal users. For frequent users, the 
average call setup delay during an INVITE flood is 0.97 seconds. 
Compared to SESS, the call setup delay is a bit longer, however this 
can be disregarded.  
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5.3.2 Call setup timeout percentages during flooding 
attacks. 
In this experiment, the CPU usages on both firewall and SIP 
proxy server are measured during an INVITE flood attack. The CPU 
usage on the two components will be compared under each level of 
security as for the previous set of experiments.  
Figure 37 illustrates the experimental results.  
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Figure 37: Average call setup timeouts under various security 
levels 
As we can see from figure 37, the average call setup timeout 
during an INVITE flood, under no security is 14 times higher than that 
under application-layer stateless firewall. With SESS and ISESS, there 
are no setup timeouts, which improves the performance of this system 
significantly.  
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5.3.3 CPU usages on the firewall and SIP proxy server 
during an attack 
This experiment measures the CPU usages on both firewall and 
SIP proxy server during an INVITE flood when the system is under 
various security levels.  Figure 38 illustrates the experimental results.  
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Figure 38: Comparison of CPU usages on firewall and SIP 
proxy server under various security levels. 
As can be seen, when there is no security deployed in the system 
the flooding attack can easily overload the SIP proxy server with 
spoofed requests (the server is almost at 100% CPU) and result in the 
high call setup timeout rate seen in the previous experiments. The 
average CPU usage at the firewall is only 15%, which indicates the 
firewall is not fully utilized. 
When an application-layer stateless firewall is used the firewall 
will have to carry out much more processing than it does with its basic 
iptables forwarding (no security) rules. During the attack the CPU 
usage on the firewall is only increased to 24% (a 9% increase) and it is 
still able to process other incoming requests. The CPU usage on the 
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SIP proxy server is 1%. This is because only legitimate requests are 
allowed to pass through the firewall, the SIP proxy server only 
processes a limited number of requests, and thus even though the 
system is under an attack the CPU usage on the proxy server should 
not be affected by the attack traffic. Thus with authentication at the 
firewall, load balance is achieved and the SIP proxy server does not 
become overloaded by the attack. Further, there was no call setup 
timeout under the stateless application-layer predictive nonce checking 
system.  
When using SESS the average CPU usage on the firewall 
increases to 26.5% due to spoofed requests being authenticated. The 
CPU usage on the proxy server is similar to that seen in the application 
layer stateless firewall configuration despite the fact that the server is 
in charge of updating user lists – i.e. the list update is very efficient 
and does not happen too often.  
When ISESS is configured, the average CPU usage on the 
firewall is the same as that in SESS, because the methods to process 
spoofed SIP requests are identical on both systems. The CPU usage on 
the SIP proxy is 1% which shows that no attack packet has passed 
through the firewall.  
5.3.4 ACK flood on SESS and ISESS 
SESS is designed to stop spoofed INVITE and REGISTER 
flooding requests, as these can be challenged by digest authentication. 
However, flooding attacks based on other spoofed SIP requests such as 
the ACK packet pass through the firewall without any authentication 
and so are not countered by SESS. ACK packets are processed by the 
SESS proxy to find out the source IP of a legitimate user. Thus, a large 
amount of spoofed ACK can exhaust the resource on the SESS SIP 
proxy server.  In order to verify this hypothesis, an ACK flooder tool 
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was developed based on iFlood, to send out ACK requests. The tool 
allows the „attacker‟ to specify how many packets are to be sent, the 
rate of attacking traffic, and the range of spoofed source IP addresses. 
Additionally, it allows the attacker to specify the user ID to use. This 
can be useful, as some SIP proxy servers are restricted to processing 
requests with a SIP URL-formatted source address.  
ISESS is considered to be a mitigation technique that is able to 
stop any type of SIP request floods. In order to verify this hypothesis, 
a series of experiments are conducted to verify the performance of the 
systems under ACK floods. 
As with the earlier experiments, the ACK flooding experiment 
was carried out with spoofed traffic at 1000 packets per chunk with 
one second delays. 
Call setup delays during ACK floods for SESS and ISESS: 
Figure 39 compares the average call setup delays for frequent 
users during ACK floods under SESS and ISESS. 
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Figure 39: Comparison of average call setup delays under 
ACK floods with SESS and ISESS 
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From figure 39 we can see that the average call setup delay in 
SESS is 5.90 seconds during ACK floods (this calculation excludes the 
call setup timeouts). The reason is that if the spoofed ACK are passed 
through to the SESS proxy server, it will record the source IP 
addresses as legitimate and eventually crash due to lack of memory 
space. As expected, the ACK flood does affect the performance of 
SESS. 
When ISESS is configured, the average call setup delay for a 
frequent user when the system is under an ACK flood attack was 
measured at 0.815 seconds. This reduces the call setup delay in SESS 
by 86%. Also, none of the attack packets was captured on the SIP 
proxy server, which means the firewall still has a very high (in our 
experiment this is 100%) success rate in blocking spoofed ACK 
requests.  
This 0.815 second call setup delay is partially caused by network 
congestion. The network congestion happens when a chunk of attack 
traffic is sent, and can be identified in the above diagram as the peaks 
of call setup delays.   
This test result also shows that during an INVITE flood, the 
average call setup delay is slightly greater (0.155 seconds) than with 
an ACK flood as the firewall has to send back digest authentication 
messages to the spoofed addresses. In order to verify this assumption, 
we measured the call setup delays for a frequent user, when the ISESS 
is under INVITE flooding attack and compared them with those under 
ACK flooding attack.  
Call setup timeout during ACK floods for SESS and ISESS 
Figure 40 compares the average call setup timeout percentages 
during an ACK flood attack for SESS and ISESS. 
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Figure 40: Comparison of call setup timeout percentages for 
SESS and ISESS during ACK floods 
When the system is configured with SESS, during an ACK 
flooding attack the average call setup timeout for users is 27.3%. 
However, with ISESS it is reduced to 0%. This is because in SESS, all 
spoofed ACK requests are passed through the firewall and processed 
by the SIP proxy server which has to store all spoofed source IP 
addresses in its memory, and finally the server will crash due to lack of 
memory space. This is the reason for high call setup timeouts in the 
previous experiment. Figure 41 shows the log message when the SIP 
proxy server crashes. 
The server error log clearly illustrates the reason for the 500 
Server Internal Error is lack of memory. Thus, the ACK flood attack 
can exhaust the memory resource on the SESS server and cause a 
denial of service attack.   
This experiment verifies that ISESS is able to block other SIP 
request floods, apart from INVITE and REGISTER. In the following 
section, we furthered the experiments using PROTOS test suite, which 
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can generate spoofed CANCEL messages to see how ISESS mitigates 
this type of attacks. 
 
Figure 41: Server crash log message 
5.3.5 Other SIP request floods against ISESS 
The PROTOS program [94]was developed at the University of 
Oulu in Finland as an inexpensive way to test protocol 
implementations for security vulnerabilities. The PROTO test suite 
c07-sip is used to test the robustness of SIP protocol. This test suite 
can be used to generate session teardown streams, where a sequence of 
spoofed INVITE, CANCEL and ACK requests are sent to the proxy 
server. The attacker can specify the content of each header field (to 
form either malformed message attack or overflow attack) to cause a 
denial of service problem on the SIP proxy server. The test results 
from the PROTO group have demonstrated that SIP is vulnerable to a 
number of malformed attacks.  
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In our experiment, we use PRORO c07-sip as an attacker 
generating session teardown packets (INVITE, CANCEL and ACK 
messages with corresponding CallIDs). The reason to choose teardown 
attack is because this attack generates all the most common SIP 
requests. Thus, we can test how well ISESS defeats the spoofed SIP 
request attack. Figure 42 [94] illustrates the session teardown process. 
 
Figure 42: PROTO teardown process 
 
In our test bed, when a teardown attack is launched, the packets 
sent by PROTO are illustrated in Figure 43. 
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Figure 43: PROTO SIP teardown attack packet flow diagram 
 
The PROTO first sends an INVITE request, followed by 
CANCEL and OK requests. As specified in RFC 3261, Section 9.1 
states: The Request-URI, CallID, To, the numeric part of CSeq, and 
From header fields in the CANCEL request MUST be identical to 
those in the request being cancelled,  including tags. Since there is no 
expected reply for the first INVITE request after sending a sequence of 
SIP session teardown requests the PROTO will repeatedly send out 
INVITE requests.  
We used wireshark to monitor the number of attack packets 
passed through the firewall. From our experiment, we observed that no 
attack packet had passed through the ISESS firewall. This is because 
PROTO c07-sip does not have a SIP digest authentication protocol 
stack in its application, so the authentication challenge cannot be 
processed by the test suite. Thus INVITE messages cannot pass 
through the firewall authentication. Without passing the firewall 
authentication, other SIP requests will be dropped by the firewall.  
PROTO Firewall SIP proxy 
INVITE 
CANCEL 
407/Auth. required 
No Reply…… 
OK 
INVITE 
INVITE 
INVITE 
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This experiment proves that ISESS is able to defeat all types of 
SIP request flooding attacks.  
 
5.4 Analysis and Conclusion 
The trials clearly indicate that both SESS and ISESS have an 
extremely high (experimental results how a 100%) success rate in 
blocking SIP INVITE and REGISTER floods, while maintaining a 
good QoS for legitimate users. This is because when attackers use 
spoofed source IP addresses, they will never receive the digest 
challenge message and so cannot calculate the nonce value. All 
spoofed SIP requests will fail the firewall authentication, and get 
dropped. Since SESS and ISESS place the requests from known users 
in a different queue from other requests, no matter how severe the 
flooding attack is, as long as there is enough bandwidth to transfer the 
requests, the call setup delays for legitimate users are not affected by 
the attack.  
The call setup delay experiment proves that SESS and ISESS can 
improve the call setup delay by 94.8% (=0.487s/9.39s) and 89.6% (= 
0.97/9.39s) compared to no security. This occurs because requests 
from legitimate users are directly passed through the iptables rules to 
the proxy server and do not need application level processing and 
authentication, so the latency due to the firewall process is negligible.  
Experimental results also show that for frequent users SESS and 
ISESS provide a 93.7% (=0.487s/7.06s) and 86.2% (= 0.97s/7.06s) 
improvement of call setup delay compared to an application-layer 
stateless firewall when the system is under INVITE flooding attacks. 
This is because in an application-layer stateless firewall, requests from 
legitimate users and spoofed INVITE requests will be treated in the 
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same way by the firewall - they will all be passed from the network 
interface to an application-layer nonce checking process.  Since in the 
stateless firewall scenario, all requests have to be authenticated with 
predictive nonce authentication, and each request has to be processed 
twice, which is very processing intensive, and time consuming, thus, 
the call setup delay is increased. Plus, as there is only a single FIFO 
queue to pass the packets to the application layer, the time for packets 
waiting in the queue increases. Thus, when the system is under 
flooding attack the call setup delay for legitimate users will increase. 
However, by using SESS, known legitimate users‟ requests are passed 
to the SIP proxy directly, so do not need to wait in the queue to be 
authenticated by the firewall.   
The average call setup time for a frequent user in ISESS during 
INVITE flood is twice as long as that in SESS (0.97 seconds). This is 
caused by the extra check on the received INVITE request on the 
proxy. Since this increase in delay is not significant (0.49 seconds), it 
can be disregarded. 
The average call setup delay difference for a frequent user and a 
normal user is very similar. This is because the call setup delay is just 
caused by the prioritization at the firewall, and this process is the same 
in both SESS and ISESS.  
The call setup delay for new users in ISESS is significantly 
longer (about 1 second) than that in SESS and the application-layer 
firewall. This is because in ISESS when a new user tries to place a call, 
an extra KASP message is processed to add that user to the “temporary 
userlist” on both firewall and SIP proxy. This process increases the 
call setup delay for new users.  
The call setup delay differences between normal users and 
frequent users in both SESS and ISESS are very similar (0.2 and 0.17 
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seconds). It is important to note that this time difference has little to do 
with the iptables rule matching delay because the ACCEPT iptables 
rules for the normal user and frequent user are inserted at the top of the 
iptables rule sets. This delay difference is caused by the differentiated 
Type of Service (ToS) settings for frequent users, where frequent users 
are signed with “Minimize-Delay”. Thus, SIP requests from frequent 
users are passed to the SIP proxy server with the highest priority, and 
requests from normal users are not prioritised. This feature should 
provide the same QoS for known users even when the system is under 
severe flooding attacks because the spoofed requests are sent to the 
INPUT queue to be authenticated by the firewall, while requests from 
known hosts are sent to the FORWARD queue and will be forwarded 
regardless of how congested the INPUT queue is.  
The time for known user lists expiry will affect the call setup 
delays for all users to an extent. The shorter the expiry time, the longer 
the average call setup time. This is partially because when an entry in 
the lists expires, the SIP proxy has to fork a thread to perform the 
action of removing the user from the corresponding list, and send a 
KASP message to the firewall. This process would require some CPU 
power, and if this happens too often, the performance of the SIP 
system can degrade. The other reason is that if a user is removed from 
the known user lists too soon, then the probability that he is treated as 
a new user is higher. At the extreme, if the user expiry time is set to 0 
second, this system setup delay will be similar to that in the 
application-layer stateless firewall, as the user has to go through the 
firewall authentication every time he makes a call. This would increase 
the average call setup time for this user.  
Contrarily, the performance of the system would also degrade if 
the user list expiry time is set too high, as this could result in a very 
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long legitimate user list and contention for RAM in the SIP Proxy 
server. Thus, it is important to select an optimal userlist size.   
From the above experiments we can see that ISESS is able to 
block any types of spoofed SIP request, even though the average call 
setup delay for users is slightly longer than with SESS. Since the 
increase in call setup delay can hardly be noticed by human beings, 
ISESS is a preferable solution for SIP flood attacks. It is worth noting 
that the ISESS system cannot compensate for a heavily congested 
network. When the network is congested, most of the packets will be 
randomly dropped by the intermediate routers. In an extreme situation, 
legitimate requests may never be able to reach the firewall.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion and future work 
6.1 Other considerations 
6.1.1 SIP Botnet attacks 
A Botnet attack [95] is caused when a number of Internet 
computers are subverted without their owners‟ knowledge in order to 
forward transmissions (including spam or viruses) to other computers 
on the Internet. Botnets are used in the majority of DDoS attacks. 
According to the VoipSA blog [96], SIP botnets can be created even 
though there is no evidence of a clear and present threat. Nassar et al 
[97] have developed a proof-of-concept SIP Internet Relay Chat (IRC) 
botnet, which is able to send successive INVITE requests, and spoofed 
REGISTER requests, as well as scan urls of legitimate users.  As 
shown in figure 44, ISESS will be able to counter this type of botnet.  
 
Figure 44, ISESS counters simple botnet attacks 
In this simple botnet attack scenario, the attacking bots are not 
attached to any SIP protocol stacks or SIP clients, and the bots are very 
similar to any other SIP flooding tools. The bots can either use the real 
Botnet Firewall SIP proxy 
INVITE 
INVITE 
407/Auth. required 
407/Auth. required 
. 
. 
. 
. 
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source IP addresses or spoofed addresses. In this case, since no SIP 
protocol stack is installed on the attacking machines, the authentication 
challenge messages cannot be processed, and no legal re-INVITE 
message can be generated. Thus, no attack request can pass through 
the firewall, when ISESS is used.  
Even though there is no evidence of advanced SIP botnet, there 
is a potential for attack tools to be created which fully understand the 
SIP protocol, and can be hooked up with real SIP clients, and so 
generate legal SIP requests and respond to any authentication requests. 
As shown in figure 45, ISESS will not be able to counter this type of 
attack because it considers all SIP requests that accomplish a three-
way handshake to be legitimate.  
 
Figure 45: Advanced botnet on ISESS 
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Since the bots are all legal SIP clients, they will initiate SIP 
sessions in exactly the same manner as legitimate SIP clients so ISESS 
cannot distinguish this attack from normal session initiations. When all 
advanced botnet traffic passes through the firewall, and reaches the 
SIP proxy server, the server will be totally occupied by these requests, 
and this could result in a DoS attack on the system. If the attack traffic 
is targeting an existing client, this can also cause DoS on that 
particular client.  
6.1.2 ISESS in the real-world scenario 
6.1.2.1 Global view 
In the real-world scenario, SIP proxies are normally 
interconnected with each other across the globe to enable international 
VoIP sessions, as shown in figure 46. The communication between 
two hosts usually involves the request forward among different SIP 
proxies.  
 
Figure 46: SIP call setup in a global scenario 
Even though the network infrastructure is different, the call setup 
process in a global scenario is very similar to that in a local setup. The 
China 
proxy 
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proxy Internet 
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OK 
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SIP proxy servers are still vulnerable to flooding attacks originating 
either from their own internal networks, or from the Internet. The way 
to launch an attack is the same as that launched on our testbed.  
6.1.2.2 Session Border Controller 
In some scenarios, ISPs may deploy a session border controller 
(SBC) [98] to exert control over signalling and media traffic. An SBC 
normally acts as a back-to-back user agent (B2BUA) and is  
essentially an application layer gateway and proxy situated between 
the participants of a session. It receives a request and processes it as a 
user agent server, then it determines how the request should be 
answered, and acts as a user agent client to generate requests. The 
caller would recognize this B2BUA as the called party. This helps to 
hide the internal address of a particular SIP user agent.  
Security features on SBCs differ from vendor to vendor. Acme 
packet SBC [99] provides SIP flooding protection by limiting the 
bandwidth of “unknown hosts”. Figure 47 explains the DoS mitigation 
mechanism on ACME packet SD.  
 
Figure 47: DoS mitigation on ACME packet SD. 
Traffic Manager 
    CAM 
Layer-3 firewall 
Trusted 
Path 
 Untrusted 
Path 
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 100 
An access control list (ACL) is used to eliminate access from 
“malicious hosts”. Since the firewall and SIP proxy are built on the 
same host, the ACL is stored at the content addressable memory 
(CAM) for easy modification and sharing between the SIP proxy and 
the layer-3 firewall. When a packet comes in, if it is from a blocked 
host, the layer-3 firewall will drop it. Otherwise, it will be passed to a 
traffic manager, which is responsible for categorizing the packet as 
either “trusted” or “untrusted”. The untrusted packets will be passed to 
a limited path, and sent to the SIP proxy server. The server will update 
the ACL by either promoting a host as “trusted”, or demoting a host as 
“blocked” based on the activity of that host.  
The ACL-based access on one hand could help reduce the impact 
of a DDoS attack from a known attacker. However, since SIP attackers 
normally use spoofed IP addresses, it is likely that this approach would 
not be very effective. Additionally, since this approach is host-based, 
i.e. IP address-based, there is a risk that the attacker would spoof an IP 
addresses of a legitimate user and so cause a denial of service to the 
legitimate users. 
SBCs are beyond the scope of this project however, it provides  
ideas on whether to integrate the ISESS system into a single host. This 
would be a useful area for future research. 
 
6.2 Conclusion and future work 
As the dominant VoIP session initiation and management 
protocol, SIP is susceptible to various attacks, especially flood-based 
DoS attacks. Some of the existing commercial firewalls, for example: 
AR450 from AlliedTelesis have SIP anti-flooding mechanisms to 
protect a SIP proxy server from DoS attacks. However experimental 
results have shown that the anti-flood mechanisms on these firewalls 
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may be defeated. Existing work has identified some countermeasures, 
however they all have various limitations and some of them are not 
practical to implement. This project has identified and trialled a 
number of countermeasure designs.   
From the experiments carried out during the course of this 
research, a Security Enhanced SIP System (SESS) was developed. 
SESS consists of an enhanced SIP-aware firewall and an enhanced SIP 
proxy server which communicates using a protocol called KASP.  
SESS extends and synthesises existing research to create an advanced 
SIP security capability which was demonstrated to be very effective 
against a SIP INVITE or REGISTER flooding attack.  However, 
further testing using other flooding attacks demonstrated that SIP ACK 
flooding traffic could pass through the firewall and achieve its target 
of denial of service. 
Subsequently, an Improved Security Enhanced SIP System 
(ISESS) was developed by enhancing SESS further in order to counter 
a wide range of SIP flooding attacks. Using ISESS, all SIP flooding 
traffic is blocked at the firewall, no matter what type of attack packet 
is used.   
ISESS counters the flooding attack effectively and avoids 
timeout due to SIP proxy overloads. The performance of ISESS is 
good for known users even under a severe flooding attack. The 
average call setup delay for a frequent user in ISESS is just under a 
second, and for a normal user just over a second.  Unknown user setup 
is about 7 seconds.   
While ISESS will handle any form of flooding packet, and some 
forms of botnet attack, a fully SIP-aware botnet attack using real 
addresses would be indistinguishable to ISESS from legitimate traffic. 
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Further research is needed to address this form of future botnet 
capability. 
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References: 
 
[1] N. Banerjee, S. Saklikar, and S. Saha, "Anti-vamming trust 
enforcement in peer-to-peer VoIP networks." pp. 201-206. 
[2] Y. Soupionis, S. Dritsas, and D. Gritzalis, An Adaptive Policy-
Based Approach to SPIT Management: Springer, 2008. 
[3] D. Geneiatakis, G. Kambourakis, T. Dagiuklas et al., “SIP 
Security Mechanisms: A state-of-the-art review,” Proc. 5th 
International Network Conference (INC), pp. 147–155. 
[4] H. Schulzrinne, and J. Rosenberg, “A Comparison of SIP and 
H. 323 for Internet Telephony,” Proc. International Workshop 
on Network and Operating System Support for Digital Audio 
and Video (NOSSDAV), pp. 83–86. 
[5] D. Endler, “VoIP hacking exposed,” 
p.121,147,167,369,389,429,487,505, McGraw-Hill, 2007. 
[6] E. T. Aire, B. T. Maharaj, and L. P. Linde, “Implementation 
considerations in a SIP based secure voice over IP network,” 
AFRICON, 2004. 7th AFRICON Conference in Africa, vol. 1, 
2004. 
[7] E. C. Cha, H. K. Choi, and S. J. Cho, “Evaluation of Security 
Protocols for the Session Initiation Protocol,” Computer 
Communications and Networks, 2007. ICCCN 2007. 
Proceedings of 16th International Conference on, pp. 611-616, 
2007. 
[8] Q. Qiu, "Study of Digest Authentication for Session Initiation 
Protocol (SIP)," December, 2003. 
[9] S. Salsano, L. Veltri, and D. Papalilo, “SIP security issues: the 
SIP authentication procedure and its processing load,” Network, 
IEEE, vol. 16, no. 6, pp. 38-44, 2002. 
[10] S. McGann, and D. C. Sicker, “An Analysis of Security 
Threats and Tools in SIP-Based VoIP Systems,” Proceedings 
of the 2 ndWorkshop on Securing Voice over IP, Cyber 
Security Alliance, 2005. 
[11] V. D. Gligor, “A NOTE ON THE DENIAL-OF-SERVICE 
PROBLEM,” Proceedings of the 1983 Symposium on Security 
and Privacy, April 25-27, 1983, Oakland, California, 1984. 
[12] P. Hunter, “VOIP the latest security concern: DoS attack the 
greatest threat,” Network Security, vol. 2002, no. 11, pp. 5-7, 
2002. 
[13] shawnmer, “Hackers send thousands of fake calls to deaf 
people,” VOIPSA, http://voipsa.org/blog/2008/03/20/hackers-
 104 
send-thousands-of-fake-calls-to-deaf-people/, Mar. 2008, 
Accessed 1 Oct 2008. 
[14] D. Sass, “Voice over IP Security Planning, Threats and 
Recommendations, 
http://www.infosecwriters.com/text_resources/pdf/VOIP_DSas
s.pdf,” 2006,, Accessed Aug 2007. 
[15] S. J. Templeton, and K. E. Levitt, “Detecting spoofed packets,” 
DARPA Information Survivability Conference and Exposition, 
2003. Proceedings, vol. 1, 2003. 
[16] T. Chiba, T. Katoh, B. B. Bista et al., “DoS Packet Filter Using 
DNS Information,” Proceedings of the 20th International 
Conference on Advanced Information Networking and 
Applications-Volume 1 (AINA'06)-Volume 01, pp. 116-131, 
2006. 
[17] B. E. Fredrik Thernelius, “SIP Firewall Solution,” 
http://www.softarmor.com/wgdb/docs/draft-thernelius-sip-
firewall-solution-00.txt, Accessed Sep. 2007. 
[18] J. Kim, S. Yoon, Y. Won et al., “VoIP Secure Communication 
Protocol satisfying Backward Compatibility,” Systems and 
Networks Communications, 2007. ICSNC 2007. Second 
International Conference on, pp. 43-43, 2007. 
[19] A. Yaar, A. Perrig, and D. Song, “SIFF: a stateless Internet 
flow filter to mitigate DDoS flooding attacks,” Security and 
Privacy, 2004. Proceedings. 2004 IEEE Symposium on, pp. 
130-143, 2004. 
[20] CCS-WG, “Quality of Service (QoS) Standard for Telephone 
Services,” http://www.ofta.gov.hk/en/ad-comm/tsac/cc-
paper/ccs2005p11.pdf, 2005, Accessed Feb.2008. 
[21] D. Endler, and M. Collier, Hacking Exposed VoIP: Voice Over 
IP Security Secrets & Solutions (Hacking Exposed): McGraw-
Hill Osborne Media, 2006. 
[22] I. Rec, “H. 323, Packet based Multimedia Communications 
Systems, http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-H.323/en/,” 
Telecommunication Standardization Sector of ITU, Accessed 
Jul 2007, 2003. 
[23] M. Handley, H. Schulzrinne, E. Schooler et al., “SIP: Session 
Initiation Protocol,” vol. 2543, 1999. 
[24] H. Schulzrinne, S. Casner, R. Frederick et al., “RFC1889: RTP: 
A Transport Protocol for Real-Time Applications,” Internet 
RFCs, 1996. 
[25] RFC768, “UDP, User Datagram Protocol, IETF Standard,” 
August, 1980. 
[26] I. Rec, “H. 245,” Control protocol for multimedia 
communication, http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-H.245/en/, 1998, 
Accessed Jul. 2007. 
 105 
[27] I. Rec, “H. 225,” Call signalling protocols and media stream 
packetization for packet-based multimedia communication 
systems , http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-H.225.0/en/, 1998, 
Accessed Jul 2007. 
[28] M. Shore, H. 323 and Firewalls: Problem Statement and 
Solution Framework, https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/draft-
shore-h323-firewalls/, Internet Draft, Accessed Aug 2007. 
[29] T. Berners-Lee, L. Masinter, and M. McCahill, "Uniform 
Resource Locators (URL)," RFC 1738, CERN, Xerox 
Corporation, University of Minnesota, December 1994 
(http://ds. internic. net/rfc/rfc1738. txt), 1994. 
[30] T. Berners-Lee, R. Fielding, and H. Frystyk, "RFC2616 - 
Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1," May, 1996. 
[31] I. Packetizer, “H.323 versus SIP: A Comparison,” 
http://www.packetizer.com/ipmc/h323_vs_sip/, Accessed 
May/2007. 
[32] R. Rivest, “RFC1321: The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm,” 
Internet RFCs, 1992. 
[33] M. Zandi, M. V. Martin, and P. C. K. Hung, “Overview of 
security issues of VOIP,” IASTED European Conference on 
Proceedings of the IASTED European Conference: internet 
and multimedia systems and applications table of contents, pp. 
254-259, 2007. 
[34] P. C. K. Hung, and M. V. Martin, “Through the looking glass: 
Security issues in VoIP applications,” Proceedings of the 
IADIS International Conference on Applied Computing. 
[35] P. A. Version, “Eavesdropping an IP Telephony Call.” 
[36] US-CERT, “Understanding Denial-of-Service Attacks,” 
http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/tips/ST04-015.html, 2008. 
[37] L. Garber, “Denial-of-Service Attacks Rip the Internet, 
ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=839316,” 2000, 
Accessed Sep 2007. 
[38] H. Wang, D. Zhang, and K. G. Shin, “Detecting SYN flooding 
attacks,” INFOCOM 2002. Twenty-First Annual Joint 
Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications 
Societies. Proceedings. IEEE, vol. 3, 2002. 
[39] C. C. Center, “CERT Advisory CA-1996-21 TCP SYN 
Flooding and IP Spoofing Attacks,” Internet: http://www. cert. 
org/advisories/CA-1996-21. html, September, 1996, Accessed 
Sep 2007. 
[40] J. Farrell, "IP Fragmentation Attacks on Checkpoint Firewalls, 
www.giac.org/certified_professionals/practicals/gsec/0589.php 
", April, 2001. Accessed Dec 2007. 
[41] D. Forte, “Fragmentation Attacks: Protection Tools and 
Techniques Called “true preliminaries to denial-of-service”, 
 106 
IpFrags are a tough nut to crack for some firewalls and 
intrusion detection systems,” Network Security, vol. 2001, no. 
12, pp. 12-13, 2001. 
[42] M. Kenney, “Ping of Death, insecure.org/sploits/ping-o-
death.html,” Insecure. org, 1996, Accessed Sep. 2007. 
[43] J. Albers, B. Hahn, S. McGann et al., “An analysis of security 
threats and tools in SIP-based VoIP Systems,” Retrieved April, 
vol. 4, pp. 2006, 2005. 
[44] L. Juranic, Using fuzzing to detect security vulnerabilities, 
Technischer Bericht INFIGO-TD-01-04-2006, Infigio 
Information Security, Zagreb, Kroatien, April 2006. 
[45] R. Baumann, S. Cavin, and S. Schmid, “Voice Over IP-
Security and SPIT,” Swiss Army, FU Br, vol. 41. 
[46] J. Quittek, S. Niccolini, S. Tartarelli et al., “Detecting SPIT 
Calls by Checking Human Communication Patterns,” 
Communications, 2007. ICC'07. IEEE International 
Conference on, pp. 1979-1984, 2007. 
[47] S. Niccolini, “SPIT prevention: state of the art and research 
challenges,” Network Laboratories, NEC Europe, Germany. 
[48] M. Hansen, M. Hansen, J. M 鰈 ler et al., “Developing a 
Legally Compliant Reachability Management System as a 
Countermeasure against SPIT,” Third annual security 
workshop (VSW?6). 
[49] B. Sterman, D. Schwartz, and E. Katz, "DETECTION OF SPIT 
IN VOIP CALLS," WO Patent WO/2006/126,202, 2006. 
[50] A. Patrizio, “Vishing Joins Phishing as Security Threat,” 
Internet News, http://www. internetnews. com/security/article. 
php/3619086, accessed July, vol. 11, 2006. 
[51] T. Chan, S. Sengodan, N. R. Center et al., “On applying SIP 
security to networked appliances,” Networked Appliances, 
2002. Gaithersburg. Proceedings. 2002 IEEE 4th International 
Workshop on, pp. 31-40, 2002. 
[52] J. McCarron, “A Brief Overview of VoIP Security.” 
[53] J. Zar, “VoIP Security and Privacy Threat Taxonomy,” Public 
Release, vol. 1, pp. 24, 2005. 
[54] P. Ferguson, and D. Senie, “RFC2267: Network Ingress 
Filtering: Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ 
IP Source Address Spoofing,” 1998. 
[55] R. K. C. Chang, “Defending against flooding-based distributed 
denial-of-service attacks: a tutorial,” Communications 
Magazine, IEEE, vol. 40, no. 10, pp. 42-51, 2002. 
[56] H. Wang, C. Jin, and K. G. Shin, “Defense against spoofed IP 
traffic using hop-count filtering,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on 
Networking (TON), vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 40-53, 2007. 
 107 
[57] D. Kashiwa, E. Y. Chen, and H. Fuji, “Active shaping: a 
countermeasure against DDoS attacks,” Universal Multiservice 
Networks, 2002. ECUMN 2002. 2nd European Conference on, 
pp. 171-179, 2002. 
[58] A. Bremler-Barr, R. Halachmi-Bekel, I. C. Herzliya et al., 
“Unregister Attacks in SIP,” Secure Network Protocols, 2006. 
2nd IEEE Workshop on, pp. 32-37, 2006. 
[59] E. Nuwere, and M. Varpiola, “The Art of SIP Fuzzing and 
Vulnerabilities found in SIP,” BlackHat Conference, Las Vegas, 
NV, July, 2005. 
[60] A. Hussain, J. Heidemann, and C. Papadopoulos, “A 
framework for classifying denial of service attacks,” 
Proceedings of the 2003 conference on Applications, 
technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer 
communications, pp. 99-110, 2003. 
[61] M. Collier, “Basic Vulnerability Issues for SIP Security, 
http://download.securelogix.com/library/SIP_Security030105.p
df,” Research Report, 2005, Accessed Sep. 2007. 
[62] K. Egevang, and P. Francis, "The IP Network Address 
Translator (NAT)," RFC 1631, May 1994, 1994. 
[63] D. Endler, and M. Collier, “Hacking Exposed VoIP: Voice 
Over IP Security Secrets & Solutions (Hacking Exposed),” 
http://hackingvoipexposed.com/sec_tools.html, pp. 395-398, 
2006. 
[64] Xianglin Deng, and C.-W. Lee, “Security of VoIP-SIP flooding 
and its Mitigation,” New Zealand Computer Science Research 
Student Conference 08', 2008. 
[65] H. Aljifri, “IP Traceback: A New Denial-of-Service 
Deterrent?,” 2003. 
[66] J. Ioannidis, and S. M. Bellovin, “Implementing Pushback: 
Router-Based Defense Against DDoS Attacks,” Proceedings of 
Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, vol. 2, 
2002. 
[67] M. Kim, and K. Chae, “Detection and Identification 
Mechanism against Spoofed Traffic Using Distributed 
Agents,” Time, vol. 26, no. 31, pp. 36. 
[68] J. Li, J. Mirkovic, M. Wang et al., “SAVE: source address 
validity enforcement protocol,” INFOCOM 2002. Twenty-First 
Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and 
Communications Societies. Proceedings. IEEE, vol. 3, 2002. 
[69] H. L. Flanagan, “Egress filtering–keeping the Internet safe 
from your systems,” Online at http://rr. sans. 
org/sysadmin/egress. php, April, 2001, Accessed Dec 2007. 
[70] T. Peng, C. Leckie, and K. Ramamohanarao, “Protection from 
distributed denial of service attacks using history-based IP 
 108 
filtering,” Communications, 2003. ICC'03. IEEE International 
Conference on, vol. 1, 2003. 
[71] H. Aljifri, “IP traceback: a new denial-of-service deterrent?,” 
Security & Privacy Magazine, IEEE, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 24-31, 
2003. 
[72] M. T. Goodrich, “Efficient packet marking for large-scale IP 
traceback,” Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on 
Computer and communications security, pp. 117-126, 2002. 
[73] S. M. Bellovin, “ICMP Traceback Messages,” 2003. 
[74] M. Sung, and J. Xu, “IP Traceback-based Intelligent Packet 
Filtering: A Novel Technique for Defending Against Internet 
DDoS Attacks,” IEEE Transactions on Parallel and 
Distributed Systems, vol. 14, no. 9, pp. 861-872, 2003. 
[75] D. X. Song, and A. Perrig, “Advanced and authenticated 
marking schemes for IP traceback,” INFOCOM 2001. 
Twentieth Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and 
Communications Societies. Proceedings. IEEE, vol. 2, 2001. 
[76] H. Sengar, H. Wang, D. Wijesekera et al., “Fast Detection of 
Denial of Service Attacks on IP Telephony,” Proceedings of 
the 14th IEEE International Workshop on Quality of Service 
(IWQoS 2006), 2006. 
[77] S. Fowler, and S. Zeadally, “Defending against Distributed 
Denial of Service (DDoS) Attacks with Queue Traffic 
Differentiation over Micro-MPLS-based Wireless Networks,” 
Network, vol. 10, pp. 11, 2006. 
[78] B. Reynolds, and D. Ghosal, “Secure IP telephony using multi-
layered protection,” NDSS Symposium, San Diego, CA, 2003. 
[79] Y. You, M. Zulkernine, and A. Haque, “Detecting Flooding-
Based DDoS Attacks,” Communications, 2007. ICC'07. IEEE 
International Conference on, pp. 1229-1234, 2007. 
[80] H. Sengar, D. Wijesekera, H. Wang et al., “VoIP Intrusion 
Detection Through Interacting Protocol State Machines,” 
Dependable Systems and Networks, 2006. DSN 2006. 
International Conference on, pp. 393-402, 2006. 
[81] E. Y. Chen, “Detecting DoS attacks on SIP systems,” VoIP 
Management and Security, 2006. 1st IEEE Workshop on, pp. 
53-58, 2006. 
[82] D. Geneiatakis, and C. Lambrinoudakis, “An ontology 
description for SIP security flaws,” Computer Communications, 
vol. 30, no. 6, pp. 1367-1374, 2007. 
[83] T. Peng, C. Leckie, and K. Ramamohanarao, “Survey of 
network-based defense mechanisms countering the DoS and 
DDoS problems,” ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), vol. 39, 
no. 1, 2007. 
 109 
[84] J. Rosenberg, Request Header Integrity in SIP and HTTP 
Digest Using Predictive Nonces, expired Internet draft, work in 
progress, IETF, June 2001. 
[85] M. Ohta, “Overload Protection in a SIP Signaling Network,” 
Internet Surveillance and Protection, 2006. ICISP'06. 
International Conference on, pp. 11, 2006. 
[86] N. Aschenbruck, M. Frank, P. Martini et al., “Present and 
Future Challenges Concerning DoS-attacks against PSAPs in 
VoIP Networks,” Proceedings of the Fourth IEEE 
International Workshop on Information Assurance, April, pp. 
13-14, 2006. 
[87] S. Ehlert, G. Zhang, D. Geneiatakis et al., “Two layer Denial of 
Service prevention on SIP VoIP infrastructures,” Computer 
Communications, 2008. 
[88] J. Jung, B. Krishnamurthy, and M. Rabinovich, “Flash crowds 
and denial of service attacks: characterization and implications 
for CDNs and web sites,” Proceedings of the eleventh 
international conference on World Wide Web, pp. 293-304, 
2002. 
[89] R. Sailer, and M. Kabatnik, “History based distributed 
filtering-a tagging approach to network-level access control,” 
COMPUTER SECURITY APPLICATIONS, pp. 11-15, 2000. 
[90] S. D. D'Souza, and D. Vinokurov, “Queuing methods for 
mitigation of packet spoofing, 
http://www.google.co.nz/patents?hl=en&lr=&vid=USPATAPP
10712103&id=fsmfAAAAEBAJ&oi=fnd&dq=queuing+metho
d+for+mitigation+of+packet+spoofing,” US Patent App, 2004, 
Accessed Feb. 2008. 
[91] R. Droms, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol," RFC 2131, 
March 1997, 1997. 
[92] S. B. Lim, and D. Ferry, “JAIN SLEE 1.0 Specification, final 
release,” Sun Microsystems, Inc. and Open Cloud Limited 
March, 2004. 
[93] M. Mareztke, “JAIN SLEE technology overview,” 
http://www.maretzke.de/pub/lectures/jslee_overview_2005/JSL
EE_Overview_2005.pdf, 2005. 
[94] U. o. Oulu, “PROTOS - Security Testing of Protocol 
Implementations,” 
http://www.ee.oulu.fi/research/ouspg/protos/, Accessed July 
2008. 
[95] R. Puri, “Bots & botnet: An overview,” SANS Institute’03, 
2003. 
[96] VOIPSA, http://voipsa.org/blog/2007/05/07/ready-or-not-
here-come-the-irc-controlled-sipvoip-attack-bots/, 2008. 
 110 
[97] Mohamed Nassar, Radu State, and O. Festor, “VoIP-IRC bot,” 
http://www.loria.fr/~nassar/readme.html, 2008. 
[98] G. Camarillo, “Functionality of Existing Session Border 
Controller (SBC), http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-camarillo-
sipping-sbc-funcs-00,” IETF Draft, February14, vol. 4, 2005, 
Accessed Mar 2008. 
[99] A. Packet, “Acme Packet Net-Net Session Border Controllers,” 
Product information, 2004. 
 
 
